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J.P. Morgan
Tech Exchange 2019
专题讨论嘉宾简介
陈秀珍女士是摩根大通的董事总经理及摩根大通私人银行亚洲中国市场投资团队主管。陈女士常
驻香港,负责带领团队为客户提供投资组合及投资咨询服务,专注于股票、固定收益及另类资产
市场创造的绝对回报机会。
陈女士在1998年加盟摩根大通投资银行外汇部门,任职于外汇衍生产品的机构业务部。陈女士曾
先后调往摩根大通投资银行在新加坡、纽约和香港的办事处,专责为主权财富基金和对冲基金等
机构客户提供外汇和股票衍生产品和服务。陈女士于2012年加盟摩根大通私人银行担任全球另类
投资团队亚洲主管,负责亚洲区内对冲基金、私募股权、房地产和直接交易机会的开发和尽职审
查工作。
陈女士毕业于日本国际基督教大学的公共管理研究所学院,取得经济发展学硕士学位。陈女士在
日本留学期间获颁全额奖学金。
陈秀珍
摩根大通私人银行中国投资部主管
黄直女士于2018年5月加入摩根大通中国,担任政府关系负责人。2004年,她于纽约加入金融服
务行业,并开始职业生涯。2009年,黄女士回到中国,加入中国银行业监督管理委员会,担任衍
生品监管处的负责人。2012年,黄女士被调任中国银行间市场交易商协会,担任交易规范部负责
人。2014年至2018年5月,黄女士就职于美国纽约梅隆银行,担任北京分行行长。
黄女士本科就读于中国科学技术大学,取得学士学位。2004年,她获得哥伦比亚大学博士学位,
运筹学专业。
黄直
摩根大通中国区政府关系负责人
吴安澜先生是摩根大通私人银行亚洲投资策略部主管,负责制定私人银行关于亚洲区内市场、经
济及地缘政治因素方面的观点与见解,并致力于为区内投资者及客户提供相关咨询及建议。
加盟摩根大通之前,吴先生曾于安本标准投资管理公司出任新兴市场资深经济学家一职,负责为
客户提供围绕中国及全球新兴市场的经济分析与宏观投资策略。此前,他曾在美国国务院与国防
部任职长达十年,也曾担任美国驻北京大使馆经济处及美国在台协会的外交事务员,负责监督一
系列经济政策事务,包括贸易及投资协商、实施制裁、知识产权保护并且就宏观经济发展向高级
官员提供相关建议。加入外交部之前,吴先生曾出任美国国防部官员,专注亚洲安全及国防政策
事务。吴先生除了担任公职外,还曾于雷曼兄弟及浙江财经大学工作。
吴先生持有美国约翰霍普金斯大学及匹兹堡大学经济学系学士学位,曾就中国经济发展、美国外
交政策以及朝鲜事务发表多篇文章,现居香港,能操国语及阅读中文。
吴安澜
摩根大通私人银行亚洲投资策略部主管
2018年底,美国前财政部长亨利·保尔森在预见中美贸易争端的演变时使
用了带有冷战气息的用语:「我目前认为「经济铁幕」有可能降临,即
美中双方互相封闭并使全球经济倒退。」
自从中国经济于1970年代末对外开放以来,西方世界普遍认为中国的崛
起对他们的经济模式并不构成威胁。这一观点背后的逻辑在于,西方的
优势是创新,而中国的角色是制造。
如今,这一观点正在被颠覆。中国公司在人工智能、量子计算、第五代
通讯(5G)、电动汽车等领域的技术发展已经走在世界的前列。
吴安澜先生说:「当今世界有许多相互竞争却高度融合的经济体。」就
在数小时之前,中美贸易争端出现了进一步的升级。
「他们目前已完全失去了对彼此的信任,正在寻求降低对彼此的依赖。」
然而,吴安澜先生和黄直女士都认为当前形势尚未达到「铁幕」和「冷
战」的程度。
吴安澜先生说:「这不是冷战,因为这些经济体已经高度融合,不可分
割。」
有別于科技发展基本独立的美国和前苏联,中
美两国是全球一体化经济体系中不可或缺的组成部分。
黄直女士说:「美国很难彻底断绝与中国的贸
易关系,尤其考虑到科技不断发展的复杂性。」
「科技已成为关键基础架构的一部分,就像能
源和原油供应。」
中美「冷战」言过其实
这不是冷战,因为这些经
济体已经高度融合,不可
分割。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
中美两国的紧张关系源自于许多不同的因素。虽然近期媒体的注意力
一直集中在西方市场以国家安全为名封杀中国科技巨头的行动,但科
技冲突通常与贸易战和国家对自给自足的追求密切相关。
谈到相互依存的概念,目前两国对彼此的需要程度可能超出了人们的
想象。
吴安澜先生说:「从商品价值来看,中国的半导体进口量超出了原油
进口量,而且超出幅度不小。」(半导体是当今复杂电子设备的组成
元件。)
中国从美国、台湾和韩国进口半导体。考虑到这些国家大多受益于中
国中产阶级的壮大并且获利不菲,因此贸易关系的任何变动都将对这
些国家产生显著的影响。
中美对抗的根源
但吴安澜先生指出,这种准入限制以往已有先例,并非美
国的独创。「多年来中国一直在战略性地降低外资在本国
科技基础设施中的比重,而且华为事实上从2012年前后就
已被美国封杀。因此,尽管目前华为事件不断充斥着各大
媒体的头条,但并不一定是导致中美紧张关系的新源头。」
此外,作为直接参与美国贸易谈判的人员,吴安澜先生表
示在贸易谈判过程中,各方需要关注的不是任何具体的协
议,而是协议的持续履行。
他说:「虽然很多协议在达成的过程中耗费了大量的时间
和精力,但这些协议中的很大一部分最终并没有带来运作
方式、企业或政府惯例的改变。」
吴安澜先生说:「协议的执行是关键。在技术转让等问题
上,我们很难执行这些协议或者了解这些条款是否得到
遵守。」
协议的执行是关键。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
吴安澜先生认为,「中国制造2025」旨在实现
的进口替代实际上是对目前出口国利益的损害。
他说:「对于三星或台湾或韩国的政策制定者
而言,这是一项令人担忧的战略。」
那么,这场中美科技角力未来可能升级到何种
程度?吴安澜先生预计,在最严重的情况下,中
国公司可能会被禁止在硅谷设立基地,但这种
情形不会很快发生。
此外,更具破坏性的影响可能是对外国科技公
司的市场准入限制,类似于目前美国对华为的
封杀。
中国的半导体进口量
超出了原油进口量。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
竞争并不一定意味着决出胜负。有时候,这种竞争关系完全不存在。
吴安澜先生说:「比竞争对手更快地发展人工智能具有明显的优势。但在
5G方面,先发优势并非如此重要。」
随着中国不断在西方传统优势产业中实现发展,其庞大的规模有望中国公
司在半导体或电动汽车等领域占据主导,正如它们在电子产品或太阳能电
池板领域现已取得的领先优势。
危中有机
黄直女士表示,中国对新一代科技的投入有望引发新一轮
历时多年的投资周期。换言之,全球公司将迎来一个新的
竞争和增长时代,减轻人们对长期经济停滞的忧虑。
黄直女士说:「中国应从当前的压力中看到机会。」
她说:「从积极的一面看,他们可开展更多的科技创新研
发以增强实力并推进市场化改革。」
如果中美两国避免进一步的冲突并参与公平竞争,我们或
许有望迎来一个新的以人工智能发展为核心的创新黄金时
代。
中国应从当前的压力
中看到机会。
黄直
中国区政府关系负责人
摩根大通
Meet the Panelists
Jackey Chan is a Managing Director and the Investment Team Lead for China Market of J.P. Morgan Private Bank for Asia. Based in Hong Kong, she leads her team on providing portfolio management and investment advisory services for clients with a focus on absolute returns across equities, fixed income and alternative assets.
Ms. Chan joined J.P. Morgan Investment Bank in 1998 in the Foreign Exchange Department as an institutional sales person focusing on foreign exchange derivatives. Subsequently, she relocated to Singapore, New York and Hong Kong offices servicing institutional clients such as sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds on foreign exchange and equity derivatives products. She then joined J.P. Morgan Private Bank in 2012 as the Asia Head of Global Alternative Investments Group, where her responsibilities include the origination and due diligence of hedge fund, private equity, real estate and direct deal opportunities in Asia.
Ms. Chan received a Master degree in Economic Development from the Graduate School of Public Administration, International Christian University in Japan, where she was awarded a full scholarship.
Jackey Chan
Head of Investments for China
J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Gina Huang joined J.P. Morgan China in May 2018, serving as Head of Government Relations. She started her career in financial services industry at New York City since 2004. In 2009, Ms. Huang came back to China, her motherland, and joined China Banking Regulatory Commission as Head of Derivative Supervision Division. In 2012, she was appointed as Head of Secondary Market Surveillance Dept. at National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors. From 2014 to May 2018, Ms. Huang served as Beijing Branch Manager for Bank of New York Mellon.
Ms. Huang earned her Bachelor’s degree from University of Science and Technology of China. She also holds a PHD from Columbia University, majoring in Operations Research.
Gina Huang
Head of Government Relations
J.P. Morgan China
Alexander Wolf is the Head of Investment Strategy for Asia at J.P. Morgan Private Bank. In this role, Mr. Wolf is responsible for developing and communicating the Private Bank’s view on the market, economy, and geopolitics for investors and clients in the Asia region.
Prior to joining J.P. Morgan, Mr. Wolf was the Senior Emerging Markets Economist with Aberdeen Standard Investments responsible for economic analysis and macro investing strategies covering China and global EM. Prior to this he spent ten years with the U.S. Government in roles at the State Department and Defense Department. Most recently, Mr. Wolf served as part of the diplomatic service with overseas postings to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the American Institute in Taiwan. His responsibilities included managing a range of economic policy issues including trade and investment negotiations, sanctions implementation, intellectual property rights protection, as well as advising senior officials on macroeconomic issues. Prior to joining the diplomatic service, Mr. Wolf was an officer at the Defense Department working on Asian security and defense policy. In addition to his government experience, Mr. Wolf has held roles at Lehman Brothers and Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics.
Mr. Wolf holds degrees in economics from Johns Hopkins University and the University of Pittsburgh and has published extensively on China’s economy, US foreign policy, and North Korea. He resides in Hong Kong and speaks and reads Mandarin Chinese.
Alexander Wolf
Head of Investment Strategy for Asia
J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Competition doesn’t always have to have winners and losers. And sometimes, there is no competition at all.
“For Artificial Intelligence, there are clear advantages for advancing more quickly than your competitors,” said Wolf, “But regarding 5G, it might not matter as much who comes first.”
As China continues to advance in industries traditionally controlled by Western firms, its sheer size alone could bring Chinese firms to dominate industries such as semiconductors or electric vehicles the same way it has with electronic goods or solar panels.
危中有机
Huang suggested that Chinese investment in next generation technologies might spark a new multi-year investment cycle. In other words, the response from global companies could usher in a new era of competition and growth, allaying fears of secular stagnation.
“It might be good for China to see this current pressure as an opportunity,” said Huang.
“They can do more research and development in technological innovation, to build capability, and to reform to a more market-driven system,” she said. “There could be a silver lining.”
If the two countries avoid further conflict and engage in fair competition, it’s not unrealistic to suggest that we might see a new golden age of innovation led by advancements in artificial intelligence.
中国应从当前的压力
中看到机会。
黄直
中国区政府关系负责人
摩根大通
Unlike the United States and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), where science and technology developed on two largely independent tracks, the United States and China are part of a globally integrated economic system.
“For the U.S. to really divorce with China, it would be very challenging – and that challenge will be compounded by the growing technology development,” said Huang.
“Tech has become part of the critical infrastructure – the same way energy is, or the same way oil supplies are.”
At the end of 2018, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson evoked Cold War terminology in his premonition for the evolving U.S.-China trade disagreements: “I now see the prospect of an economic Iron Curtain – one that throws up new walls on each side and unmakes the global economy as we have known it.”
Since the opening up of the Chinese economy in the late 1970s, the West has largely held the view that China’s rise posed no threat to their economic model. The logic was that the West would innovate, and China would make.
However, this view is being upended as Chinese companies are racing ahead in technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G, and electric vehicles, to name just a few.
“You now have highly integrated economies that see each other as adversaries,” said Wolf, just hours after an apparent further escalation in the bilateral trade dispute.
“They currently have a complete lack of trust in each other, and they’re looking to reduce their reliance on each other.”
Nonetheless, neither Wolf nor Huang believe that an “Iron Curtain” or “Cold War” are appropriate characterizations for the current situation.
“This isn’t a cold war,” said Wolf, “because the economies are too heavily integrated.”
中美「冷战」
言过其实
这不是冷战,因为
这些经济体已经高
度融合,不可分
割。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
The sources of tension are numerous and varied. While much of the recent media attention has been devoted to the blocking of some of China’s largest tech players to Western markets amid apparent security concerns, the tech conflict is more often connected with the broader trade war and a pursuit for national self-sufficiency.
To return to the notion of interdependence, it may surprise some to learn what each country currently needs from each other.
“In terms of value, China imports more semiconductors than they do oil – and by some margin,” explains Wolf. (Semiconductors are the building blocks of today’s complex electronic devices.)
China buy these semiconductors from the United States, Taiwan and Korea, and given that many of these economies make a lot of money from supplying China’s growing middle class, any change will be significant.
中美对抗的根源
中国的半导体进口
量超出了原油进口
量。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
Wolf posits that “Made in China 2025” aims to replace imports with domestic production effectively saying to their current suppliers, “we want to put you out of business.”
“If you were Samsung, or a policymaker in Taiwan, or Korea, that would be concerning,” he says.
So what is the furthest extent that these tech tensions could go? Wolf can see an escalation to the point where Chinese companies could be blocked from establishing bases in Silicon Valley, but not on the imminent horizon.
In addition, the more damaging aspect could be restricting market access in each country to the other countries’ tech firms, similar to what is currently happening with regard to Huawei in the United States.
But Wolf notes, that isn’t new, or even a U.S. phenomenon, “China has been strategically reducing foreign components in its tech infrastructure for a number of years, and Huawei has been de facto blocked from the United States since around 2012. So while it’s currently making headlines, it’s not necessarily a new source of tensions.”
Moreover, as someone who has participated directly in trade negotiations for the United States, Wolf declared that amidst the ongoing trade negotiations, attention needed to be paid not to any specific deal itself, but follow through of the deal.
“Despite all the time and energy invested in reaching agreements, a good proportion of these deals do not ultimately lead to changes in operating methods, business or government practices,” he said.
“Enforcement is key,” said Wolf. “On issues such as tech transfer, it is very difficult to enforce these agreements, or know whether the terms are being abided by.”
协议的执行是关键。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
内行观点
吴安澜先生曾经在美国政府任职十年,
代表美国政府就多项双边事宜与中国
洽商。在本视频中,他针对当前中美
贸易争端为双方未来的合作关系和局
势发展进行了深入的探讨。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
The contest for technological dominance between the United States and China has intensified over recent years, leaving the world’s two biggest economies increasingly protective of their own leading-edge industries, and mistrustful of the other’s.
The geopolitical struggle for technological dominance is spilling over into global trade and threatening to divide the world into two technological blocs, each of which seeks autonomy and self-sufficiency and strives to limit the other’s access to its advanced know-how.
This first panel discussion at the 2019 Morgan Tech Exchange addressed this emerging idea of a “technological cold war,” and explored how it might impact the global economy and markets.
Featured on the panel was Alex Wolf, Head of Investment Strategy for Asia at J.P. Morgan Private Bank, along with Gina Huang, Head of Government Relations for J.P. Morgan in China. The session was moderated by Jackey Chan, Head of Investments for J.P. Morgan Private Bank in China.
Unpacking the Technological
Cold War
Unpacking the Technological
Cold War
简体中文
English
繁體中文
内行观点
吴安澜先生曾经在美国政府任职十年,代
表美国政府就多项双边事宜与中国洽商。
在本视频中,他针对当前中美贸易争端为
双方未来的合作关系和局势发展进行了深
入的探讨。
吴安澜
亚洲投资策略部主管
摩根大通私人银行
语音描述
阅读文字版
An Insider's View - Transcript
[Music]
Alexander Wolf: Today I spoke on a panel entitled: The Politics of Tech. A New Cold War?
where we explore this issue of increasing tech tensions between the US and China as they evolve past a trade war and trade negotiations, what does this increased competition over tech look like?
We talked about what the implications could be for investors, how both economies could be affected, and how this, in many ways, unprecedented situation of great power competition, rapid advancement in China, the threat that China can pose to western tech companies. How that might play out in the future.
A good example is 5G.
Right now, China in many ways leads the world in terms of 5G operational roll out.
But an example of just how interconnected the two economies are is that China is ahead of the US in rolling out 5G, but, in many ways the 5G network in China relies on critical components from the US.
So, very much it is a double-edged sword.
in that they heavily rely on each other, and the fact is that a lot of countries around the world, if they want to roll out 5G cheaply, will probably have to rely on Chinese firms to do it.
And so this interconnectedness, and then the threat of that pulling apart in this concept of a tech cold war, creates very large risks.
We do think that this interconnectedness is profitable, it’s, for many companies, it boosts growth, it’s positive for consumers … will be enough to prevent some of these worst possible outcomes.
As tensions increase, as this competition increases, whether it’s rapid advancement of China in 5G or its rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, facial recognition etc. … competition is not necessarily a bad thing.
I think the way this is often portrayed, even just using the phrase cold war, makes it sound overwhelmingly negative.
But the fact is, in the actual Cold War, you saw one of the erm, a period of rapid innovation because of competition between the US and Soviet Union.
And so as China is competing in semiconductors, as China’s competing in a lot of industries they didn’t used to compete in, it is forcing more investment - on both sides.
And as you see increased investment, whether it’s in IOT or many of these fast growing sectors, that investment can boost growth.
That investment can boost innovation.
That investment is good for the consumer.
And so, competition, just like competition between companies, competition between countries is not necessarily something to fear.
So, there could be a silver lining there.
One thing we did talk about on the panel was this, of course, old Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction.
Where, right now, because China relies on the US consumer, and the US market. Whereas, US companies also rely on the Chinese market for sales. But because both countries rely on each other, there is so much, there is a lot of sales, there’s a lot of trade, there’s a lot of profits generated by trade between countries, and that is enough to prevent some of the worst outcomes.
And so while we think that there are different risks of a tech cold war, there are risks of the economies decoupling, there’s risks of these economies seeking self-autonomy in the tech world.
The fact is that integration of the two economies’ trade, multi nationals, manufacturing base being set up in both countries, has been very successful, has been very positive.
X
近年来,中美之间的科技统治地位之争日趋白热化。世界最大的两个经济体对本国尖端行业的保护日益加大,相
互的不信任感逐渐加深。
围绕科技统治地位的地缘政治角力正在蔓延到全球贸易领域,或将使世界分裂为两大科技阵营。每个阵营都努力
寻求独立自主、自给自足,同时对另一方阵营实行尖端技术封锁。
作为摩根大通科智荟2019的首场专题讨论,本场会议着重探讨了正在兴起的「科技冷战」概念及其对全球经济和
市场的潜在影响。
参与本场专题讨论的嘉宾是摩根大通私人银行亚洲投资策略部主管吴安澜先生(Alexander Wolf)和摩根大通中国政
府关系主管黄直女士。本场会议由摩根大通私人银行中国投资部主管陈秀珍女士主持。
科技冷战:言过其实,危中有机
科技冷战:言过其实,危中有机
繁體中文
English
简体中文
Close Transcript
An Insider's View - Transcript
[Music]
Alexander Wolf: Today I spoke on a panel entitled: The Politics of Tech. A New Cold War?
where we explore this issue of increasing tech tensions between the US and China as they evolve past a trade war and trade negotiations, what does this increased competition over tech look like?
We talked about what the implications could be for investors, how both economies could be affected, and how this, in many ways, unprecedented situation of great power competition, rapid advancement in China, the threat that China can pose to western tech companies. How that might play out in the future.
A good example is 5G.
Right now, China in many ways leads the world in terms of 5G operational roll out.
But an example of just how interconnected the two economies are is that China is ahead of the US in rolling out 5G, but, in many ways the 5G network in China relies on critical components from the US.
So, very much it is a double-edged sword.
in that they heavily rely on each other, and the fact is that a lot of countries around the world, if they want to roll out 5G cheaply, will probably have to rely on Chinese firms to do it.
And so this interconnectedness, and then the threat of that pulling apart in this concept of a tech cold war, creates very large risks.
We do think that this interconnectedness is profitable, it’s, for many companies, it boosts growth, it’s positive for consumers … will be enough to prevent some of these worst possible outcomes.
As tensions increase, as this competition increases, whether it’s rapid advancement of China in 5G or its rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, facial recognition etc. … competition is not necessarily a bad thing.
I think the way this is often portrayed, even just using the phrase cold war, makes it sound overwhelmingly negative.
But the fact is, in the actual Cold War, you saw one of the erm, a period of rapid innovation because of competition between the US and Soviet Union.
And so as China is competing in semiconductors, as China’s competing in a lot of industries they didn’t used to compete in, it is forcing more investment - on both sides.
And as you see increased investment, whether it’s in IOT or many of these fast growing sectors, that investment can boost growth.
That investment can boost innovation.
That investment is good for the consumer.
And so, competition, just like competition between companies, competition between countries is not necessarily something to fear.
So, there could be a silver lining there.
One thing we did talk about on the panel was this, of course, old Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction.
Where, right now, because China relies on the US consumer, and the US market. Whereas, US companies also rely on the Chinese market for sales. But because both countries rely on each other, there is so much, there is a lot of sales, there’s a lot of trade, there’s a lot of profits generated by trade between countries, and that is enough to prevent some of the worst outcomes.
And so while we think that there are different risks of a tech cold war, there are risks of the economies decoupling, there’s risks of these economies seeking self-autonomy in the tech world.
The fact is that integration of the two economies’ trade, multi nationals, manufacturing base being set up in both countries, has been very successful, has been very positive.
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