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J.P. Morgan
Tech Exchange 2019
專題討論嘉賓簡介
陳秀珍女士是摩根大通的董事總經理及摩根大通私人銀行亞洲中國市場投資團隊主管。陳女士常
駐香港,負責帶領團隊為客戶提供投資組合及投資諮詢服務,專注於股票、固定收益及另類資產
市場創造的絕對回報機會。
陳女士在1998年加盟摩根大通投資銀行外匯部門,任職於外匯衍生產品的機構業務部。陳女士曾
先後調往摩根大通投資銀行在新加坡、紐約和香港的辦事處,專責為主權財富基金和對沖基金等
機構客戶提供外匯和股票衍生產品和服務。陳女士於2012年加盟摩根大通私人銀行擔任全球另類
投資團隊亞洲主管,負責亞洲區內對沖基金、私募股權、房地產和直接交易機會的開發和盡職審
查工作。
陳女士畢業於日本國際基督教大學的公共管理研究所學院,取得經濟發展學碩士學位。陳女士在
日本留學期間獲頒全額獎學金。
陳秀珍
摩根大通私人銀行中國投資部主管
黃直女士於2018年5月加入摩根大通中國,擔任政府關係負責人。2004年,她於紐約加入金融服
務行業,並開始職業生涯。2009年,黃女士回到中國,加入中國銀行業監督管理委員會,擔任衍
生品監管處的負責人。2012年,黃女士被調任中國銀行間市場交易商協會,擔任交易規範部負責
人。2014年至2018年5月,黃女士就職於美國紐約梅隆銀行,擔任北京分行行長。
黃女士本科就讀於中國科學技術大學,取得學士學位。2004年,她獲得哥倫比亞大學博士學位,
運籌學專業。
黄直
摩根大通中國區政府關係負責人
吳安瀾先生是摩根大通私人銀行亞洲投資策略部主管,負責制定私人銀行關於亞洲區內市場、經
濟及地緣政治因素方面的觀點與見解,並致力於為區內投資者及客戶提供相關諮詢及建議。
加盟摩根大通之前,吳先生曾於安本標準投資管理公司出任新興市場資深經濟學家一職,負責為
客戶提供圍繞中國及全球新興市場的經濟分析與宏觀投資策略。此前,他曾在美國國務院與國防
部任職長達十年,也曾擔任美國駐北京大使館經濟處及美國在台協會的外交事務員,負責監督一
系列經濟政策事務,包括貿易及投資協商、實施制裁、知識產權保護並且就宏觀經濟發展向高級
官員提供相關建議。加入外交部之前,吳先生曾出任美國國防部官員,專注亞洲安全及國防政策
事務。吳先生除了擔任公職外,還曾於雷曼兄弟及浙江財經大學工作。
吳先生持有美國約翰霍普金斯大學及匹茲堡大學經濟學系學士學位,曾就中國經濟發展、美國外
交政策以及朝鮮事務發表多篇文章,現居香港,能操國語及閱讀中文。
吳安瀾
摩根大通私人銀行亞洲投資策略部主管
2018年底,美國前財政部長亨利·保爾森在預見中美貿易爭端的演變時使
用了帶有冷戰氣息的用語:「我目前認為「經濟鐵幕」有可能降臨,即
美中雙方互相封閉並使全球經濟倒退。」
自從中國經濟於1970年代末對外開放以來,西方世界普遍認為中國的崛
起對他們的經濟模式並不構成威脅。這一觀點背後的邏輯在於,西方的
優勢是創新,而中國的角色是製造。
如今,這一觀點正在被顛覆。中國公司在人工智能、量子計算、第五代
通訊(5G)、電動汽車等領域的技術發展已經走在世界的前列。
吳安瀾先生說:「當今世界有許多相互競爭卻高度融合的經濟體。」就
在數小時之前,中美貿易爭端出現了進一步的升級。
「他們目前已完全失去了對彼此的信任,正在尋求降低對彼此的依賴。」
然而,吳安瀾先生和黃直女士都認為當前形勢尚未達到「鐵幕」和「冷
戰」的程度。
吳安瀾先生說:「這不是冷戰,因為這些經濟體已經高度融合,不可分
割。」
有別於科技發展基本獨立的美國和前蘇聯,中
美兩國是全球一體化經濟體系中不可或缺的組
成部分。
黃直女士說:「美國很難徹底斷絕與中國的貿
易關係,尤其考慮到科技不斷發展的複雜性。」
「科技已成為關鍵基礎架構的一部分,就像能
源和原油供應。」
中美「冷戰」言過其實
這不是冷戰,因為這些經
濟體已經高度融合,不可
分割。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
中美兩國的緊張關係源自於許多不同的因素。雖然近期媒體的注意力
一直集中在西方市場以國家安全為名封殺中國科技巨頭的行動,但科
技衝突通常與貿易戰和國家對自給自足的追求密切相關。
談到相互依存的概念,目前兩國對彼此的需要程度可能超出了人們的
想像。
吳安瀾先生說:「從商品價值來看,中國的半導體進口量超出了原油
進口量,而且超出幅度不小。」(半導體是當今複雜電子設備的組成
元件。)
中國從美國、臺灣和韓國進口半導體。考慮到這些國家大多受益於中
國中產階級的壯大並且獲利不菲,因此貿易關係的任何變動都將對這
些國家產生顯著的影響。
中美對抗的根源
但吳安瀾先生指出,這種准入限制以往已有先例,並非美
國的獨創。「多年來中國一直在戰略性地降低外資在本國
科技基礎設施中的比重,而且華為事實上從2012年前後
就已被美國封殺。因此,儘管目前華為事件不斷充斥着各
大媒體的頭條,但並不一定是導致中美緊張關係的新源
頭。」
此外,作為直接參與美國貿易談判的人員,吳安瀾先生表
示在貿易談判過程中,各方需要關注的不是任何具體的協
定,而是協定的持續履行。
他說:「雖然很多協議在達成的過程中耗費了大量的時
間和精力,但這些協議中的很大一部分最終並沒有帶來運
作方式、企業或政府慣例的改變。」
吳安瀾先生說:「協議的執行是關鍵。在技術轉讓等問題
上,我們很難執行這些協議或者瞭解這些條款是否得到遵
守。」
協議的執行是關鍵。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
吳安瀾先生認為,「中國製造2025」旨在實現
的進口替代實際上是對目前出口國利益的損害。
他說:「對於三星或臺灣或韓國的政策制定者
而言,這是一項令人擔憂的戰略。」
那麼,這場中美科技角力未來可能升級到何種
程度?吳安瀾先生預計,在最嚴重的情況下,中
國公司可能會被禁止在矽谷設立基地,但這種
情形不會很快發生。
此外,更具破壞性的影響可能是對外國科技公
司的市場准入限制,類似於目前美國對華為的
封殺。
中國的半導體進口量
超出了原油進口量。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
競爭並不一定意味着決出勝負。有時候,這種競爭關係完全不存在。
吳安瀾先生說:「比競爭對手更快地發展人工智能具有明顯的優勢。但在
5G方面,先發優勢並非如此重要。」
隨着中國不斷在西方傳統優勢產業中實現發展,其龐大的規模有望中國公
司在半導體或電動汽車等領域佔據主導,正如它們在電子產品或太陽能電
池板領域現已取得的領先優勢。
危中有機
黃直女士表示,中國對新一代科技的投入有望引發新一輪
歷時多年的投資週期。換言之,全球公司將迎來一個新的
競爭和增長時代,減輕人們對長期經濟停滯的憂慮。
黃直女士說:「中國應從當前的壓力中看到機會。」
她說:「從積極的一面看,他們可開展更多的科技創新研
發以增強實力並推進市場化改革。」
如果中美兩國避免進一步的衝突並參與公平競爭,我們或
許有望迎來一個新的以人工智能發展為核心的創新黃金時
代。
中國應從當前的壓力
中看到機會。
黃直
中國區政府關係負責人
摩根大通
Meet the Panelists
Jackey Chan is a Managing Director and the Investment Team Lead for China Market of J.P. Morgan Private Bank for Asia. Based in Hong Kong, she leads her team on providing portfolio management and investment advisory services for clients with a focus on absolute returns across equities, fixed income and alternative assets.
Ms. Chan joined J.P. Morgan Investment Bank in 1998 in the Foreign Exchange Department as an institutional sales person focusing on foreign exchange derivatives. Subsequently, she relocated to Singapore, New York and Hong Kong offices servicing institutional clients such as sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds on foreign exchange and equity derivatives products. She then joined J.P. Morgan Private Bank in 2012 as the Asia Head of Global Alternative Investments Group, where her responsibilities include the origination and due diligence of hedge fund, private equity, real estate and direct deal opportunities in Asia.
Ms. Chan received a Master degree in Economic Development from the Graduate School of Public Administration, International Christian University in Japan, where she was awarded a full scholarship.
Jackey Chan
Head of Investments for China
J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Gina Huang joined J.P. Morgan China in May 2018, serving as Head of Government Relations. She started her career in financial services industry at New York City since 2004. In 2009, Ms. Huang came back to China, her motherland, and joined China Banking Regulatory Commission as Head of Derivative Supervision Division. In 2012, she was appointed as Head of Secondary Market Surveillance Dept. at National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors. From 2014 to May 2018, Ms. Huang served as Beijing Branch Manager for Bank of New York Mellon.
Ms. Huang earned her Bachelor’s degree from University of Science and Technology of China. She also holds a PHD from Columbia University, majoring in Operations Research.
Gina Huang
Head of Government Relations
J.P. Morgan China
Alexander Wolf is the Head of Investment Strategy for Asia at J.P. Morgan Private Bank. In this role, Mr. Wolf is responsible for developing and communicating the Private Bank’s view on the market, economy, and geopolitics for investors and clients in the Asia region.
Prior to joining J.P. Morgan, Mr. Wolf was the Senior Emerging Markets Economist with Aberdeen Standard Investments responsible for economic analysis and macro investing strategies covering China and global EM. Prior to this he spent ten years with the U.S. Government in roles at the State Department and Defense Department. Most recently, Mr. Wolf served as part of the diplomatic service with overseas postings to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the American Institute in Taiwan. His responsibilities included managing a range of economic policy issues including trade and investment negotiations, sanctions implementation, intellectual property rights protection, as well as advising senior officials on macroeconomic issues. Prior to joining the diplomatic service, Mr. Wolf was an officer at the Defense Department working on Asian security and defense policy. In addition to his government experience, Mr. Wolf has held roles at Lehman Brothers and Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics.
Mr. Wolf holds degrees in economics from Johns Hopkins University and the University of Pittsburgh and has published extensively on China’s economy, US foreign policy, and North Korea. He resides in Hong Kong and speaks and reads Mandarin Chinese.
Alexander Wolf
Head of Investment Strategy for Asia
J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Competition doesn’t always have to have winners and losers. And sometimes, there is no competition at all.
“For Artificial Intelligence, there are clear advantages for advancing more quickly than your competitors,” said Wolf, “But regarding 5G, it might not matter as much who comes first.”
As China continues to advance in industries traditionally controlled by Western firms, its sheer size alone could bring Chinese firms to dominate industries such as semiconductors or electric vehicles the same way it has with electronic goods or solar panels.
危中有機
Huang suggested that Chinese investment in next generation technologies might spark a new multi-year investment cycle. In other words, the response from global companies could usher in a new era of competition and growth, allaying fears of secular stagnation.
“It might be good for China to see this current pressure as an opportunity,” said Huang.
“They can do more research and development in technological innovation, to build capability, and to reform to a more market-driven system,” she said. “There could be a silver lining.”
If the two countries avoid further conflict and engage in fair competition, it’s not unrealistic to suggest that we might see a new golden age of innovation led by advancements in artificial intelligence.
中國應從當前的壓力
中看到機會。
黃直
中國區政府關係負責人
摩根大通
Unlike the United States and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), where science and technology developed on two largely independent tracks, the United States and China are part of a globally integrated economic system.
“For the U.S. to really divorce with China, it would be very challenging – and that challenge will be compounded by the growing technology development,” said Huang.
“Tech has become part of the critical infrastructure – the same way energy is, or the same way oil supplies are.”
At the end of 2018, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson evoked Cold War terminology in his premonition for the evolving U.S.-China trade disagreements: “I now see the prospect of an economic Iron Curtain – one that throws up new walls on each side and unmakes the global economy as we have known it.”
Since the opening up of the Chinese economy in the late 1970s, the West has largely held the view that China’s rise posed no threat to their economic model. The logic was that the West would innovate, and China would make.
However, this view is being upended as Chinese companies are racing ahead in technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G, and electric vehicles, to name just a few.
“You now have highly integrated economies that see each other as adversaries,” said Wolf, just hours after an apparent further escalation in the bilateral trade dispute.
“They currently have a complete lack of trust in each other, and they’re looking to reduce their reliance on each other.”
Nonetheless, neither Wolf nor Huang believe that an “Iron Curtain” or “Cold War” are appropriate characterizations for the current situation.
“This isn’t a cold war,” said Wolf, “because the economies are too heavily integrated.”
中美「冷戰」
言過其實
這不是冷戰,因為
這些經濟體已經高
度融合,不可分
割。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
The sources of tension are numerous and varied. While much of the recent media attention has been devoted to the blocking of some of China’s largest tech players to Western markets amid apparent security concerns, the tech conflict is more often connected with the broader trade war and a pursuit for national self-sufficiency.
To return to the notion of interdependence, it may surprise some to learn what each country currently needs from each other.
“In terms of value, China imports more semiconductors than they do oil – and by some margin,” explains Wolf. (Semiconductors are the building blocks of today’s complex electronic devices.)
China buy these semiconductors from the United States, Taiwan and Korea, and given that many of these economies make a lot of money from supplying China’s growing middle class, any change will be significant.
中美對抗的根源
中國的半導體進口
量超出了原油進口
量。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
Wolf posits that “Made in China 2025” aims to replace imports with domestic production effectively saying to their current suppliers, “we want to put you out of business.”
“If you were Samsung, or a policymaker in Taiwan, or Korea, that would be concerning,” he says.
So what is the furthest extent that these tech tensions could go? Wolf can see an escalation to the point where Chinese companies could be blocked from establishing bases in Silicon Valley, but not on the imminent horizon.
In addition, the more damaging aspect could be restricting market access in each country to the other countries’ tech firms, similar to what is currently happening with regard to Huawei in the United States.
But Wolf notes, that isn’t new, or even a U.S. phenomenon, “China has been strategically reducing foreign components in its tech infrastructure for a number of years, and Huawei has been de facto blocked from the United States since around 2012. So while it’s currently making headlines, it’s not necessarily a new source of tensions.”
Moreover, as someone who has participated directly in trade negotiations for the United States, Wolf declared that amidst the ongoing trade negotiations, attention needed to be paid not to any specific deal itself, but follow through of the deal.
“Despite all the time and energy invested in reaching agreements, a good proportion of these deals do not ultimately lead to changes in operating methods, business or government practices,” he said.
“Enforcement is key,” said Wolf. “On issues such as tech transfer, it is very difficult to enforce these agreements, or know whether the terms are being abided by.”
協議的執行是關鍵。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
內行觀點
吳安瀾先生曾經在美國政府任職十年,
代表美國政府就多項雙邊事宜與中國
洽商。在本視頻中,他針對當前中美
貿易爭端為雙方未來的合作關係和局
勢發展進行了深入的探討。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
The contest for technological dominance between the United States and China has intensified over recent years, leaving the world’s two biggest economies increasingly protective of their own leading-edge industries, and mistrustful of the other’s.
The geopolitical struggle for technological dominance is spilling over into global trade and threatening to divide the world into two technological blocs, each of which seeks autonomy and self-sufficiency and strives to limit the other’s access to its advanced know-how.
This first panel discussion at the 2019 Morgan Tech Exchange addressed this emerging idea of a “technological cold war,” and explored how it might impact the global economy and markets.
Featured on the panel was Alex Wolf, Head of Investment Strategy for Asia at J.P. Morgan Private Bank, along with Gina Huang, Head of Government Relations for J.P. Morgan in China. The session was moderated by Jackey Chan, Head of Investments for J.P. Morgan Private Bank in China.
Unpacking the Technological
Cold War
Unpacking the Technological
Cold War
简体中文
English
繁體中文
內行觀點
吳安瀾先生曾經在美國政府任職十年,代
表美國政府就多項雙邊事宜與中國洽商。
在本視頻中,他針對當前中美貿易爭端為
雙方未來的合作關係和局勢發展進行了深
入的探討。
吳安瀾
亞洲投資策略部主管
摩根大通私人銀行
語音描述
閱讀文字版
An Insider's View - Transcript
[Music]
Alexander Wolf: Today I spoke on a panel entitled: The Politics of Tech. A New Cold War?
where we explore this issue of increasing tech tensions between the US and China as they evolve past a trade war and trade negotiations, what does this increased competition over tech look like?
We talked about what the implications could be for investors, how both economies could be affected, and how this, in many ways, unprecedented situation of great power competition, rapid advancement in China, the threat that China can pose to western tech companies. How that might play out in the future.
A good example is 5G.
Right now, China in many ways leads the world in terms of 5G operational roll out.
But an example of just how interconnected the two economies are is that China is ahead of the US in rolling out 5G, but, in many ways the 5G network in China relies on critical components from the US.
So, very much it is a double-edged sword.
in that they heavily rely on each other, and the fact is that a lot of countries around the world, if they want to roll out 5G cheaply, will probably have to rely on Chinese firms to do it.
And so this interconnectedness, and then the threat of that pulling apart in this concept of a tech cold war, creates very large risks.
We do think that this interconnectedness is profitable, it’s, for many companies, it boosts growth, it’s positive for consumers … will be enough to prevent some of these worst possible outcomes.
As tensions increase, as this competition increases, whether it’s rapid advancement of China in 5G or its rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, facial recognition etc. … competition is not necessarily a bad thing.
I think the way this is often portrayed, even just using the phrase cold war, makes it sound overwhelmingly negative.
But the fact is, in the actual Cold War, you saw one of the erm, a period of rapid innovation because of competition between the US and Soviet Union.
And so as China is competing in semiconductors, as China’s competing in a lot of industries they didn’t used to compete in, it is forcing more investment - on both sides.
And as you see increased investment, whether it’s in IOT or many of these fast growing sectors, that investment can boost growth.
That investment can boost innovation.
That investment is good for the consumer.
And so, competition, just like competition between companies, competition between countries is not necessarily something to fear.
So, there could be a silver lining there.
One thing we did talk about on the panel was this, of course, old Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction.
Where, right now, because China relies on the US consumer, and the US market. Whereas, US companies also rely on the Chinese market for sales. But because both countries rely on each other, there is so much, there is a lot of sales, there’s a lot of trade, there’s a lot of profits generated by trade between countries, and that is enough to prevent some of the worst outcomes.
And so while we think that there are different risks of a tech cold war, there are risks of the economies decoupling, there’s risks of these economies seeking self-autonomy in the tech world.
The fact is that integration of the two economies’ trade, multi nationals, manufacturing base being set up in both countries, has been very successful, has been very positive.
X
近年來,中美之間的科技統治地位之爭日趨白熱化。世界最大的兩個經濟體對本國尖端行業的保護日益加大,相
互的不信任感逐漸加深。
圍繞科技統治地位的地緣政治角力正在蔓延到全球貿易領域,或將使世界分裂為兩大科技陣營。每個陣營都努力
尋求獨立自主、自給自足,同時對另一方陣營實行尖端技術封鎖。
作為摩根大通科智薈2019的首場專題討論,本場會議着重探討了正在興起的「科技冷戰」概念及其對全球經濟和
市場的潛在影響。
參與本場專題討論的嘉賓是摩根大通私人銀行亞洲投資策略部主管吳安瀾先生(Alexander Wolf)和摩根大通中國
政府關係主管黃直女士。本場會議由摩根大通私人銀行中國投資部主管陳秀珍女士主持。
科技冷戰:言過其實,危中有機
科技冷戰:言過其實,危中有機
A Technology Renaissance
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[Music]
Alexander Wolf: Today I spoke on a panel entitled: The Politics of Tech. A New Cold War?
where we explore this issue of increasing tech tensions between the US and China as they evolve past a trade war and trade negotiations, what does this increased competition over tech look like?
We talked about what the implications could be for investors, how both economies could be affected, and how this, in many ways, unprecedented situation of great power competition, rapid advancement in China, the threat that China can pose to western tech companies. How that might play out in the future.
A good example is 5G.
Right now, China in many ways leads the world in terms of 5G operational roll out.
But an example of just how interconnected the two economies are is that China is ahead of the US in rolling out 5G, but, in many ways the 5G network in China relies on critical components from the US.
So, very much it is a double-edged sword.
in that they heavily rely on each other, and the fact is that a lot of countries around the world, if they want to roll out 5G cheaply, will probably have to rely on Chinese firms to do it.
And so this interconnectedness, and then the threat of that pulling apart in this concept of a tech cold war, creates very large risks.
We do think that this interconnectedness is profitable, it’s, for many companies, it boosts growth, it’s positive for consumers … will be enough to prevent some of these worst possible outcomes.
As tensions increase, as this competition increases, whether it’s rapid advancement of China in 5G or its rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, facial recognition etc. … competition is not necessarily a bad thing.
I think the way this is often portrayed, even just using the phrase cold war, makes it sound overwhelmingly negative.
But the fact is, in the actual Cold War, you saw one of the erm, a period of rapid innovation because of competition between the US and Soviet Union.
And so as China is competing in semiconductors, as China’s competing in a lot of industries they didn’t used to compete in, it is forcing more investment - on both sides.
And as you see increased investment, whether it’s in IOT or many of these fast growing sectors, that investment can boost growth.
That investment can boost innovation.
That investment is good for the consumer.
And so, competition, just like competition between companies, competition between countries is not necessarily something to fear.
So, there could be a silver lining there.
One thing we did talk about on the panel was this, of course, old Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction.
Where, right now, because China relies on the US consumer, and the US market. Whereas, US companies also rely on the Chinese market for sales. But because both countries rely on each other, there is so much, there is a lot of sales, there’s a lot of trade, there’s a lot of profits generated by trade between countries, and that is enough to prevent some of the worst outcomes.
And so while we think that there are different risks of a tech cold war, there are risks of the economies decoupling, there’s risks of these economies seeking self-autonomy in the tech world.
The fact is that integration of the two economies’ trade, multi nationals, manufacturing base being set up in both countries, has been very successful, has been very positive.
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科技發展的復興時代
科技冷戰
運力未來
迎接未來的人工智能世界
智造柔性魅力
網絡安全馬拉松剛剛正式展開
暢想零售革命的未來
釋放人工智聯的無限潛能
全民娛樂
全民娛樂
當代全球化企業家
科技賦能未來銀行
暢想零售革命的未來
釋放人工智聯的
無限潛能
全民娛樂
全民娱乐
科技发展的复兴时代
Leading
Digital Bank
COMING
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科技發展的
復興時代
科技冷戰
運力未來
即將推出
即將推出
迎接未来的
人工智能世界
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即將推出
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網絡安全馬拉松
剛剛正式展開
即將推出
即將推出