2025 Myanmar General Elections
Overview
Current Political and Security Situation
Understanding the Regime’s Crackdown on Dissent
Control Risks' Analysis
SEERIST EVENT REPORT
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28 December 2025
Monitor Security Developments with Verified Events
Global Reactions to the Myanmar Election
Global Protests
Security and Political Outlook
Pre-Holiday Season Terrorism Trends
Regional Deep-Dive REPORT
Overview: 2025 Myanmar General Elections
The Myanmar military regime has scheduled general elections to take place from 28 December 2025 through the end of January 2026, with voting held in a total of 274 of the country’s 330 townships. The official campaign period runs from 28 October to 26 December.
Phase 1 28 December 2025 102 townships, including: Lashio Township (Shan State) Sagaing Township (Sagaing region) Nyaung-U Township (Mandalay region)
Phase 2 11 January 2026 100 townships, including: Waingmaw Township (Kachin State) Tanintharyi Township (Tanintharyi region) Hpapun Township (Kayin State)
Phase 3 Dates yet to be announced 72 townships, including: Hpakant Township (Kachin State) Ann Township (Rakhine State) Thantlang Township (Chin State)
Phases of the General Elections
Elections are deemed not conducive or safe to hold in 56 townships, and the newly elected government is expected to conduct by-elections for these areas at a later date. These townships include Kutkai Township (Shan State), Paletwa Township (Chin State), and Mese Township (Kayah State). Political parties involved: There are six political parties contesting nationwide and 51 parties contesting at the state and regional levels. The six parties contesting nationwide are the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), National Unity Party (NUP), People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), People’s Party (PP), Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (White Tiger Party) – SNDP and Myanmar Farmers’ Development Party (MFDP).
Analyst’s Note: The 2025 General Elections are likely to result in a preordained outcome with the military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, dominating the ensuing Parliament. This is because the elections are being carefully managed and designed to give the junta a sense of legitimacy, both nationally and globally. On 28 March, the National League for Democracy (NLD) party was systematically dissolved by the military junta's election commission. NLD, the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, had won in the last election in 2020. Ethnic armed organizations such as the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army and many others that control the territories in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states have already declared that they will not allow voting in their areas.
Holiday Terrorism Risk Overview
Phase 1 28 December 2025 102 townships, including: Lashio Township (Shan State) Sagaing Township (Sagaing region) Nyaung-U Township (Mandalay region) Hmawbi Township (Yangon)
REGIONAL OVERVIEW: MENA
Myanmar’s HIGH Political Risk indicates an environment that is persistently challenging for businesses as the Tatmadaw-established State Administration Council (SAC) continues to compete with the National Unity Government (NUG) for legitimacy as the country’s representative government in the domestic and international space.
The security situation in Myanmar has worsened since the February 2021 coup. Armed resistance groups such as the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and other loosely affiliated groups are perpetrating bombings, shootings and stabbings against military-linked personnel and assets in major cities, such as the commercial capital Yangon, Mandalay, and the capital Naypyitaw, as well as in rural areas. The Tatmadaw, in turn, has responded with disproportionate force, including military offensives against towns and villages known to be PDF strongholds, launching airstrikes, razing buildings and killing civilians.
Heatmap of verified war events in Myanmar between 18 August and 27 November 2025, following the junta’s announcement of the elections. Fighting between regime forces and armed opposition or ethnic armed groups are concentrated in resistance strongholds in the Sagaing and Magway regions.
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Myanmar’s PulseAI score on 27 November
Myanmar’s range of PulseAI scores over the past 60 days was between 33.8 and 38.08. Drops in PulseAI scores were largely driven by resistance attacks on military and military-linked assets, targeted raids on suspected resistance forces camps, and retaliatory strikes by regime forces on neighbourhoods near the site of a resistance attack.
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Sagaing and Magway Regions
CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION
The Myanmar military force is actively trying to retake several strategically important cities and townships from various armed opposition or ethnic armed groups, with current major counter offensives in Shan, Kayah, and Rakhine states.
Verified war events in Myanmar for the past 90 days between 6 September and 4 December.
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Key resistance-held areas the military force is attempting to retake include: Myawaddy: A critical trade hub on the border with Thailand. Towns along the Mandalay-China highway in Shan State: The primary trade route linking Mandalay to the Chinese border. The military have reportedly succeeded in recapturing several towns, including Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw, which were initially captured by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Townships in Kayah State: The military is attempting to push back resistance gains in a state where anti-junta forces (like the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, KNDF) control most of the territory. Ann, Taungup, Thandwe, and Gwa townships in Rakhine State: Following significant losses to the Arakan Army (AA), the military launched counteroffensives with the objectives of retaking strategically important townships in southern Rakhine State.
MONITOR SECURITY DEVELOPMENT WITH VERIFIED EVENTS
Analyst’s Note: Global reactions to Myanmar’s 2025 general election are mixed. Most democratic nations, including New Zealand, as well as major regional and international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (UN), have indicated that they do not support the election, citing concerns over its legitimacy, as the process is dominated by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In contrast, China has expressed full support for the election.
UNDERSTANDING THE REGIME'S CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT
Regional / International Organizations
ASEAN, 30 October Legitimacy concerns with election
United Nations, 10 November Legitimacy concerns with election
New Zealand, 5 November Legitimacy concerns with election
China, 24 October Support the election
DiscoverAI Summary On November 5, 2025, New Zealand Parliament unanimously rejected Myanmar military junta's planned election, deeming it neither free nor fair. The motion, introduced by MP Phil Twyford and supported by MP Teanau Tuiono, was backed by Foreign Minister Winston Peters who expressed solidarity with Myanmar's pro-democracy citizens. New Zealand views the election as a sham to legitimize the coup regime and believes it will not bring lasting peace due to repression of opposition and dissent.
Individual Countries
Myanmar Junta's Crackdown on Dissent Ahead of 2025 Elections Seerist AI-generated summary Ahead of the planned general elections in Myanmar, scheduled from December 2025 to January 2026, the ruling junta is intensifying its crackdown on dissent. This includes the use of the Election Protection Law to criminalise acts deemed to obstruct the electoral process, leading to arrests of public figures and ordinary citizens.
GLOBAL PROTESTS
Security risks are elevated due to threats of disruption from pro-democracy factions and a heightened military presence, including checkpoints and potential curfews, particularly in urban centres like Yangon and Mandalay. The junta is also employing coercive tactics to ensure voter turnout, pressuring employees and citizens to participate, which poses reputational and legal risks for businesses.
The EventsAI Emotions over the last 60 days (from 29 September to 27 November) shows that public sentiment regarding the regime’s crackdown on dissent is dominated by fear and anger, mainly due to introduction of the Election Protection Law on 29 July 2025. The Law. Hundreds of people have since been arrested and searches for suspects are still ongoing, particularly targeting resistance leaders who have openly declared the elections to be “unlawful.” Military Coercion. Both public and private sector employees may be pressured to vote or provide logistical support, creating reputational and legal exposure for companies if perceived as complicit, while refusal to comply with such coercive practices could endanger staff.
Analyst’s Note: Global protests involving Myanmar nationals and activists are periodically observed, although they are not widely reported in mainstream media. Demonstrations typically focus on opposition to the military regime, calls for the release of former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and, more recently, demands to boycott the 2025 Myanmar General Election. Such activities are most frequently reported in countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea, occurring outside prominent government buildings, such as city halls, or near embassies, particularly those of Myanmar and China.
SECURITY AND POLITICAL OUTLOOK
The protests are typically small-scale and peaceful, resulting in minimal disruption to public order, traffic, or security operations. No significant security implications have been observed globally across the verified unrest events related to anti-regime sentiment or the 2025 General Election between 1 January and 27 November 2025.
Enforcement of election law to heighten duty-of-care concerns during polling period Pro-democracy groups have vowed to disrupt the elections and continue to call for a boycott, though co-ordination remains fragmented. Many Yangon residents appear disengaged from both the election and boycott campaigns. However, compliance with the military’s election playbook is likely to rise under mounting surveillance and pressure from local administrators. Until the end of January, risk exposure for international businesses and other organistions will span security, operational and reputational dimensions.
control risks' analysis
Short-notice curfews, arbitrary enforcement or coercion of employees to demonstrate participation remain plausible.
As previously flagged, the military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, is likely to elect regime leader Min Aung Hlaing as president after the polls. Token confidence-building gestures may follow, such as amnesty for some political prisoners or the appointment of co-opted civilian figures. However, these will do little to change the entrenched architecture of military rule, nor to end Myanmar’s ongoing state of conflict. Control Risks' analysis published on 12 November 2025
Myanmar’s Country Profile – Scenarios
Big Picture series: Risks to watch as the junta’s election charade unfolds Campaigning officially begins on 28 October for what will be a carefully choreographed election, with voting to start on 28 December and continue until late January. We explore the risks organizations are likely to encounter before, during and after the polls.
For international stakeholders, the danger lies in misreading such token gestures as signals of liberalization or stability.
Military-engineered process The junta has left little to chance in designing its election calendar. The voting period will span an entire month from 28 December to the end of January, with ballots cast only in 102 townships (of the total 330 across Myanmar) and by-elections planned for 50 more townships at a later date. From the start of the official campaign period, security risks will weigh heavily in areas where voting is set to take place, especially in population centers such as Yangon and Mandalay. Armed factions associated with the pro-democracy movement – whose landslide victory in the 2020 election was rejected by the military – have vowed to disrupt the process and are likely to target polling infrastructure in military-held areas. Civil servants and schoolteachers drafted as election workers – along with voters – could be caught in the crossfire. Preordained outcome The military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), will dominate the ensuing parliament. China, India and a handful of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments may issue bland cautionary statements about the election process. However, their commercial and strategic [engagement] with the junta could begin to deepen once the new cabinet is announced, with Min Aung Hlaing – the mastermind of the 2021 coup – as president. Handpicked advisers from within and outside the military are reportedly preparing confidence-building measures to be implemented after the elections. These could include co-opted civilian figures being elevated to helm less consequential ministries, the release of some political prisoners, and the transfer to house arrest of 80-year-old civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi. These moves would be intended to project a return towards normality but would not persuade anyone that the junta is acting in good faith. For international stakeholders, the danger lies in misreading such token gestures as signals of liberalization or stability. In practice, they are designed to buy time and blunt external criticism while leaving intact the underlying architecture of arbitrary military rule, along with the population’s ever-growing resentment of it.
Security and operational risks will remain elevated until voting concludes amid threats of violent disruption from pro-democracy factions, alongside military responses such as checkpoints, and clampdowns on and intimidation of voting-age civilians, including company employees.
After the election, the military’s proxy party is likely to elect junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as president. Confidence-building gestures may follow but will not persuade domestic and international stakeholders of the military’s intent to retreat from politics.
In the coming years, new risk factors will reshape the operating environment, potentially extending volatility even to the commercial capital Yangon, which many foreign organizations have come to regard as relatively stable.
Prospects in flux The coming years will be where uncertainties gather force. Myanmar’s political trajectory is not as fixed as implied by the junta’s election plans. One possible source of uncertainty lies in the emergence of a new generation of military leaders, as Min Aung Hlaing is obliged to delegate responsibilities or seeks to elevate protégés to keep the machinery running (and protect him once he eventually retires). As the senior officer corps is stacked with loyalists whose careers and lucrative side hustles hinge on his patronage, continuity is most likely. But even in this context, the elevation of younger commanders could create unexpected room for competing visions or subtle changes in priorities. In an organization as rigid as the Myanmar army, even small variations can reshape broader dynamics. External actors add another aspect of unpredictability. The US administration’s current preoccupation with rare earth supplies gives Myanmar fresh strategic salience. If the US decides to re-engage after years of withdrawal, this could make Myanmar a minor battleground in its competition with China – something that domestic actors might be able to exploit. Ethnic armed groups could play both sides, offering pledges of access or co-operation to US and Indian firms in exchange for aid or recognition, even if they lack the means to deliver. Control Risks' analysis published on 28 October 2025
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