US Strikes and Potential Ground Offensives
Outlook for the Houthis and the Red Sea
The US Navy on 28 April confirmed that an F/A-18 fighter jet fell overboard from the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Red Sea as the ship carried out evasive manoeuvres to avoid an aerial assault by Yemen’s Houthi rebel movement. Amid sustained and wide-ranging US strikes on the Houthis and retaliatory Houthi attacks on US naval and air forces, we assess the outlook for the group, including the potential for ground offensives by anti-Houthi forces in Yemen. We also assess the threat picture for commercial traffic in the Red Sea.
Although the current US campaign has damaged the Houthis militarily and economically, the group has demonstrated an ability to effectively adjust its operational plans in response to strike patterns and will very likely retain residual capabilities to threaten merchant traffic and the US Navy and conduct further attacks on Israel.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain unlikely to give an official greenlight for a large-scale ground offensive led by anti-Houthi groups in Yemen, but we assess that a more limited offensive by some forces in Taiz province – without official regional approval – could provide a test case for broader offensives in the coming months.
The killing of senior Houthi leaders by the US or Israel, or a major anti-Houthi ground offensive supported or co-ordinated by the US, would be key triggers for the Houthis to escalate by attempting to completely shut down the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
These triggers, if met, would prompt us to raise our maritime threat levels for the Strait and the southern Red Sea from high to EXTREME.
Analysis Details
Under US President Donald Trump, the US’s air strike campaign since 15 March (Operation Rough Ride) has been considerably broader and more intense than strikes under the previous Biden administration’s Operation Poseidon Archer, even though both presidents justified their missions as efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
US Strikes
Poseidon Archer was limited by design: it only targeted the Houthis as a reactive measure. The Trump administration has coupled more intense military strikes with accelerated economic pressure by designating the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This designation offered the US administration additional military authorities to conduct attacks against the Houthis under a counter-terrorism banner, focused on systematically degrading the Houthis’ military capabilities and achieving the group’s decisive neutralisation.
Beyond Houthi weapons depots and facilities that were also targeted under Poseidon Archer, Rough Ride has targeted telecommunication towers, power stations and residential buildings believed to be hosting Houthi individuals.
In less than two months, the campaign has had more impact on the Houthi leadership than Poseidon Archer. The air strikes have killed several Houthi commanders including the brother of the group’s leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi. Under the Biden administration, there were no public reports of major Houthi figures being killed. However, it remains difficult to assess the level of degradation to the Houthis’ military capabilities as they continue to launch attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.
One key illustration of the new US approach is the targeting of Houthi-controlled ports. Under the FTO designation, the US in early April ended sanctions exemptions for countries and companies loading or unloading oil, refined products and gas – including for civilian use – and has since sanctioned three vessels for subsequently discharging such cargoes. This was followed by US strikes on 17 April that largely destroyed infrastructure at Ras Isa terminal, the group’s main hub for those imports. According to Control Risks’ sources, the Houthis have about three months’ worth of fuel, making such attacks economically damaging for the militant group and civilians in Houthi-held territories. The US military’s stated aim for the strikes was to “degrade the economic source of power of the Houthis”.
Since 15 March, after US strikes resumed and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire broke down, the Houthis have repeatedly carried out attacks against Israeli territory and the two US Navy carrier strike groups now in the region – although not all claimed attacks have occurred and no US naval assets have yet been struck by Houthi weaponry. Separate to these, Control Risks has not recorded any attacks since December 2024 targeting commercial shipping and is not aware of any Houthi claims of such attacks. However, this has been due to a lack of passing ships that fit the group’s target profile and a need to conserve weapons for assaults on US warships.
A potential indicator that the US strikes have degraded the Houthis’ current military capabilities is the declining use of more advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles in their retaliatory attacks against US forces in recent weeks. Further, the Houthis have almost certainly relied on intelligence from Iranian naval forces to aid their maritime operations since they began in late 2023 – but the Iranian Navy over the past month pulled its vessels out of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, ending its presence since 2008. Why Tehran made that decision is subject to speculation, but one explanation is that Iran feared its naval force may be targeted or risk being targeted by the US as part of the campaign against the Houthis.
The increased US naval presence and simultaneous absence of Iranian naval assets mean that any Houthi-bound Iranian missiles smuggled on dhows (small regional cargo boats) are now more likely to be intercepted. Nevertheless, we caution against over-interpreting this: other weapons systems such as aerial drones and other missile types continue to be deployed, and the Houthis have demonstrated an ability to effectively adjust their operational plans in response to strike patterns, as the 28 April incident shows.
Consequently, the US strikes and retaliatory Houthi attacks are likely to continue over the coming months, as will Houthi missile and drone launches towards Israel amid the continued redeployment of Israeli ground forces and extensive air strikes in Gaza (Palestinian Territories), even if US strikes reduce the frequency of both.
Houthi Retaliation
In the past two months, there have been media reporting and speculation about a potential ground offensive led by anti-Houthi groups in Yemen. Such an offensive would reportedly be supported politically by Washington and backed by US air strikes, at least. However, for a large-scale ground offensive to be effective, it would require a greenlight from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two key state backers of the anti-Houthi forces that comprise Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government. Either country is unlikely to officially approve such operations as the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to avoid giving a pretext for the Houthis to launch reprisal attacks against them.
Taiz Province’s coast is controlled by anti-Houthi forces led by Tareq Saleh, which are positioned more advantageously to initiate a ground offensive against Houthi-controlled areas in Taiz and Houthi provinces. If there were such an offensive, it would likely begin here.
Ground Offensive
Control Risks’ sources confirm that Tareq Saleh is currently aligned with the UAE, but we assess that Saleh is prominent enough in Yemeni politics to risk an operation against the Houthis without Abu Dhabi’s official endorsement. Tareq has been open about the need for a ground offensive against the Houthis in multiple media interviews and public conferences. Additionally, Saleh likely perceives implicit US backing as a credible boost to proceed with such an offensive.
Concurrently, over the past two weeks, the US has bombarded strategic Houthi locations on the border between Hodeidah and Taiz, almost levelling the targeted areas. The air strikes have also targeted Houthi-controlled locations in Taiz. This, combined with an operation led by Saleh’s NRF, could serve as a test for assessing the current strength of the Houthis and gauging the feasibility of a potential larger operation against them. This would allow the US to intervene without violating Trump’s opposition to a large-scale “boots on the ground” policy.
Control Risks is monitoring two key triggers that would prompt a shift in the Houthis’ strategy at sea. In this scenario, in an effort to generate international pressure in its favour, the group escalates by attempting to completely shut down the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These triggers, if met, would prompt us to raise our maritime threat levels for the Strait and the southern Red Sea from HIGH to EXTREME.
The first trigger for this scenario is the killing of a high-profile senior Houthi leader, whose demise would cause significant international embarrassment to the group and prompt it, in turn, to escalate.
The second trigger is a major anti-Houthi ground offensive, particularly if the US officially announces military support for such groups and/or US forces directly co-ordinate military operations with them.
To implement a shutdown, the Houthis would likely deploy waves of fast patrol boats to indiscriminately harass and attack commercial vessels. This would likely be accompanied by the placing – or claims to have placed – floating sea mines en masse in the Strait or southern Red Sea. Unlike the Houthis aerial and surface assaults since November 2023, which have been highly unpredictable but not entirely indiscriminate, floating sea mines would pose an indiscriminate threat including to all vessels. This would create a prolonged period either to clear mines that have been planted or to prove that mines have not been planted. In addition, most war risk insurers would likely lose appetite for underwriting vessels. Although most of the shipowners and operators still taking the Red Sea route have a high-risk tolerance, this would likely be the trigger for many of them to take the longer voyage around South Africa.
Bab el-Mandeb Shutdown Scenario
Sources: Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group F/A-18 Super Hornet Lost at Sea, US Navy
“US sanctions first vessels for trading with Houthis after OFAC deadline”, Lloyd’s List
“U.S. Strikes Spur Plans for Yemeni Ground War Against Houthis”, Wall Street Journal
“UAE, Saudi Arabia deny reports of involvement in talks about land offensive in Yemen”, Reuters
“Tariq Saleh turns the tables on the Houthis with direct support from the coalition, days after calling for unification under Hadi's leadership”, al-Mashad al-Yemeni
“Statement on air strike against Houthi military facility in Yemen: 29 April 2025”, UK Government
Control Risks’ maritime incident database Control Risks
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