Early 2026 Elections Outlook in APAC
Thailand, Bangladesh, and Nepal
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APAC Region Overview
Elections in Thailand (February 8, 2026), Bangladesh (12 February 2026), and Nepal (5 March 2026) are poised to contribute to regional unrest in the Asia-Pacific due to underlying economic stress, demands for political reform, and unpredictable security environments. In Bangladesh and Nepal, significant economic challenges and heightened expectations for reforms create a volatile backdrop for their respective elections. Thailand's election is marked by complex coalition dynamics and potential political instability, with the People's Party likely to win the most seats but requiring alliances to form a government. These national electoral processes are occurring within a broader regional context of intensifying US-China competition and the potential for social media-fueled anti-corruption protests, collectively heightening uncertainty and contributing to an unstable outlook for the region early in 2026.
Thailand: Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed from office on August 29, 2025, by the Constitutional Court due to constitutional violations related to political ethics. The case stemmed from comments made in a leaked conversation with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen concerning an ongoing border dispute, which critics alleged compromised national security. This ruling necessitated a parliamentary vote for a new prime minister, leading to a period of political instability. Protests demanding her resignation had occurred in the preceding months, fueled by public discontent over her handling of the border dispute and other governance issues. The border dispute itself acted as a significant catalyst, intensifying scrutiny and contributing to the political climate that led to her ouster. On 5 September, the House of Representatives voted in Anutin Charnvirakul (Bhumjaithai Party) as the new prime minister until snap elections in February.
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Bangladesh: The anti-government protests that erupted in mid-2024 were triggered by student opposition to public sector recruitment policies, particularly the reinstatement of a quota system that reserves some 30% of civil service jobs for relatives and descendants of veterans from the 1971 Liberation War ( Bangladesh’s war of independence from Pakistan). The demonstrations escalated following forceful security responses, with the unrest trajectory shifting from issue-based mobilization to system-level political challenge as tactics hardened and targets broadened. This culminated in the collapse of the former Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina–led Awami League government in August 2024. An interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus was subsequently installed to oversee governance and preparations for general elections scheduled for 12 February 2026.
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Nepal: The youth-led protests, known as the “Gen-Z protests”, were initially triggered by the government’s ban on 26 social media platforms. This later evolved into a broader movement fueled by public frustration over political nepotism, corruption, rising unemployment and social inequalities. Unrest peaked on 8 and 9 September 2025, with over 75 deaths during clashes between protesters and security forces. Several government and administrative buildings, and private property holdings were targeted and set ablaze. Under mounting pressure, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned. On 12 September, an interim government led by Sushila Karki was formed.
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Analyzing Thailand’s Risk Landscape & Volatility
Analyst’s Note: Thailand’s range of PulseAI scores over the past 60 days is between 55.9-67.8. Drops in Thailand’s PulseAI score were largely driven by the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia on 8 December 2025, followed by a slight drop due to a coordinated series of attacks at petrol stations on 11 January 2026. Nonetheless, the security environment in major parts of Thailand, including Bangkok remain stable. The border dispute with Cambodia despite ceasefire and terrorism incidents in southern Thailand continue to pose security challenges in affected frontier areas.
Heatmap of Verified Events across Thailand (1 Jan 2024 – 1 Jan 2026)
Seerist Pulse History & Trendline over 60 days
Thailand’s Political, Operational, and Security Risk Ratings
Anti-government Protests in the Capital City, Bangkok
Analyst’s Note: The anti-government protests were primarily observed in the capital city, Bangkok, and have been largely peaceful. Of the 45 verified unrest events recorded in Thailand between 1 January 2025 to 11 January 2026, four were directly related to protests demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. Moreover, it’s important to note the protests unfolded prior to the escalation of the Thai-Cambodia border dispute in July 2025.
Heatmap of Verified Unrest Events in Bangkok
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Timeline of Thai-Cambodia Border Clashes
Timeline of 162 Verified War Events recorded related to Thai-Cambodia border dispute since July 2025 Click green buttons to view Verified Event.
Analyzing Terrorism Trends in Southern Thailand
Analyst’s Note: From 1 January 2025 to 11 January 2026, Thailand recorded a total of 123 terrorism events. Terrorism incidents were concentrated in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and Songkhla, bordering Malaysia and were predominantly carried out by ethnic militant/insurgent groups. The Military sector (25.15%), Private Property (23.95%) and Law enforcement/Legal (23.25%) were the top three targets, while Oil and Gas sector (5.99%) rose following a coordinated series of 11 attacks on petrol stations in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala on 11 January 2026. In terms of attack type, IED/homemade (49.25%) dominated the terrorism events, followed by gunfire (firearm) (33.58%) and arson/firebomb (8.21%).
Timeline of Terrorism Events between 1 Jan 2025 – 11 Jan 2026
Insurgency threats to persist in south despite relatively low attack levels in 2025 Although the number of security incidents in the southernmost provinces in 2025 was relatively low compared with the 2000s, insurgents continue to pose persistent threats. Separate incident statistics from October to December 2025 suggest that incidental security risks are higher in Narathiwat province than in Yala, Pattani and Songkhla. Although insurgents will continue to prioritize targeting state officials and security forces, business personnel remain highly exposed to risks of collateral harm, with civilians accounting for 20% of deaths linked to insurgent attacks in 2025.
Verified Terrorism Events by ‘Sector’
The security situation is unlikely to significantly improve in the next six months, mainly as the ruling coalition led by the Bhumjaithai party is preoccupied with preparations for the 8 February election. This makes it unlikely that the government will restart peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the main insurgent movement, in the coming months. Prospects for the resumption of peace talks could improve under a new government, expected to be in place by May. Control Risks‘ Analysis
Security and Political Outlook in Thailand
Unrest risks to spike after February election if opposition party blocked from forming government The ruling Bhumjaithai party (BJT), led by Anutin, is seeking re-election at the 8 February polls. The opposition PP and Pheu Thai parties are the other main contenders to form the next government. Although Bangkok has experienced periodic large-scale political protests in the past decade, civil unrest risks are likely to remain LOW in the capital and elsewhere in Thailand ahead of the election. The major parties have been focusing on showcasing their policy agendas and electoral candidates. The PP, which arguably has the strongest capability to organise large-scale demonstrations, has refrained from using protests to pressure Anutin’s government on various points of dispute. Instead, the party has used parliamentary measures, including the threat of no-confidence motions, to scrutinise Anutin’s policies and decisions over the past few months. The PP is confident that it will do well in the election and therefore has little incentive to resort to protests. Instead, it has decided to wait until the election to defeat its political rivals.
Control Risks’ Analysis
Big Picture series: A tale of three parties – what to watch in Thailand’s 2026 election
Analysis Details Thailand is scheduled to hold its next general election on 8 February 2026. This note outlines the key parties to watch, potential outcomes and the likely implications for businesses. The two main parties to watch are the ruling Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) and the leading opposition People’s Party (PP), with the formerly ruling Pheu Thai party likely playing a kingmaker role. Although the PP is likely to win the most seats, it is unlikely to be able to form the government on its own and will seek an alliance with either the BJT or Pheu Thai. Regardless of the outcome, risks of political instability will remain elevated in 2026 due to tensions between coalition partners which could precipitate no-confidence votes. While the new government is likely to remain pro-foreign investment, a PP-led government is more likely to challenge the market dominance of large Thai conglomerates, posing risks for their foreign partners.
Analysis Details
Leading Parties
Kingmaker?
The Mirage of Stability
Implications for Investors
Sources
Leading Parties Opinion polls in recent months indicate that the BJT, led by party chief and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, and the PP are expected to be the best performers in the upcoming election. The BJT has the advantage of incumbency, having led the government since September and its ranks strengthened by defectors from other conservative political parties. Anutin has relied on economic stimulus policies to contain public discontent around rising living costs, while adopting a strident nationalistic posture on Thailand’s ongoing border conflict with Cambodia. To counter perceptions that the BJT might lack policy ideas, he has recruited several capable technocrats to his cabinet and promised voters that these figures will occupy key positions in the next government if the BJT wins the election. Nevertheless, the party faces stiff opposition in the form of the PP, which is the successor party to the Move Forward Party (MFP). The latter was the best-performing party in the 2023 election, winning 151 out of 500 lower house seats. It was then blocked from being part of the government when the previous conservative-leaning Senate (upper house of parliament) rejected MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat as prime minister. The Constitutional Court, which is also pro-conservative, in August 2024 dissolved the MFP on grounds that it had violated the constitution. With the MFP’s demise, its leaders and supporters have largely migrated to the PP.
Kingmaker? Pheu Thai, which came second in the 2023 election, is expected to do worse this time round. This is mainly due to the former Pheu Thai administration’s (2024-25) missteps on the economic and diplomatic fronts, particularly over the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict in mid-2025. Pheu Thai’s patriarch, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06), is also serving jail time for a corruption conviction. The Supreme Court in November ordered Thaksin to pay USD 560m in taxes over the sale of his telecommunications firm in 2006. Despite Thaksin’s troubles and the erosion of his public standing over the past year, Pheu Thai appears unwilling to reconsider its reliance on Thaksin’s brand to court voters. The party in mid-December nominated Thaksin’s nephew, Yodchanan Wongsawat, as its top choice for prime minister in the election. The party’s other two prime ministerial candidates, namely party chief Julapun Amornvivat and veteran politician Suriya Jungrungreangkit, are trusted Thaksin loyalists. Voters disillusioned with Thaksin are unlikely to back Pheu Thai this time, with a large proportion of former Pheu Thai supporters expected to vote for either the BJT or the PP. Nevertheless, Pheu Thai still stands to play an important role as kingmaker. Neither the PP nor the BJT is likely to win an outright majority (250 seats) in the lower house, meaning that they would need to partner either each other or with Pheu Thai to form a new coalition government. Relations between the PP and the BJT have soured over the past few months, especially after the PP threatened to file a no-confidence motion against Anutin’s government in early December. That threat was what prompted Anutin to dissolve parliament on 12 December, triggering the snap election. Pheu Thai will thus be hoping that whichever of the two parties wins will choose to partner with it rather than with each other.
The Mirage of Stability The most likely outcome involves the formation of a government that includes two of the three main parties mentioned above. However, the risk of political uncertainty and instability will remain high in 2026. This is because relations among these three parties are fraught with tension over personal animosities and policy differences. A re-emergence of such frictions could prompt votes of no-confidence and lead to the ousting of the new government before the end of 2026. The BJT had been part of the two Pheu Thai-led administrations that ruled successively from 2023 to 2025, but exited the government in mid-2025 over Pheu Thai’s handling of the border conflict, among other issues. Despite the occasional attempt at opportunistic co-operation, Pheu Thai and the PP remain at odds and are direct competitors for votes from progressive parts of Thai society. The PP has also not forgiven Pheu Thai for breaking their short-lived alliance after the 2023 election so that Pheu Thai could form a government with conservative parties.
Implications for Investors Despite its likely political troubles, the new government is likely to maintain a pro-foreign investment stance in the coming years, though its tolerance for foreign competition will be dependent on the sector. Political and regulatory openness to foreign competition is not always explicitly outlined in sectoral laws. Influential local players often rely on political and regulatory connections to maintain an informal edge over potential competitors. This underscores the need for prospective investors to understand regulators’ motivations, anticipate potential areas of obstruction, and determine the appropriate business model that will most effectively mitigate or contain risks at the market entry phase and once the investment is operational. Long-protected industries such as oil and gas, telecommunications and healthcare will continue to benefit from regulatory treatment that effectively requires foreign companies to partner with powerful Thai conglomerates to ensure that their investments are approved. By contrast, the digital sector – particularly data centers – will continue to benefit from a regulatory light-touch approach as demand for data centers in South-East Asia is expected to continue growing. Investors should pay more attention if the PP manages to secure a leading role in the new government. The PP has pledged to challenge the role of large Thai conglomerates across various sectors and to promote the interests of small- and medium-sized enterprises. While foreign investors have traditionally sought to partner with these large conglomerates to facilitate their market entry into Thailand, investors should reassess the advantages and disadvantages of doing so under a PP-led government due to the risk of elevated regulatory scrutiny.
“Anutin: voters decide if he returns as PM”, Nation Thailand “Natthaphong says People’s Party has no policy to amend Section 112, open to coalition if terms are met”, Nation Thailand “Thai party nominates ex-leader Thaksin's nephew as PM candidate”, CNA Control Risks analysis published on 31 December 2025
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Analyzing Bangladesh’s Risk Landscape & Volatility
Analyst’s Note: Bangladesh’s PulseAI scores between 25 September 2025 and 25 November 2025 ranged between 52.8 and 54.9, signaling sustained volatility. The sharpest decline occurred on 21 November, dropping to 51.1 in the wake of arson attacks that targeted businesses linked to interim government office-bearers. This took place ahead of the International Crimes Tribunal’s verdict in the former Prime Minister of Bangladesh’s, Sheikh Hasina, trial. While short-term projections suggest modest recovery in terms of stability, the regime change post-Hasina-led government in 2024 did not reset the country’s overall risk profile; it restructured it into a more targeted, economically disruptive and unpredictable form. This points to a country risk landscape with episodic, high-impact disruptions that present increased exposures for businesses and an environment prone to politically-motivated targeting.
Heatmap of Verified Crime & Unrest Events across Bangladesh (1 Jan 2024 – 11 Jan 2026)
Seerist Pulse History & Trendline over 60 Days
Bangladesh’s Political, Operational, and Security Risk Ratings
Bangladesh: From Policy-Centric Agitation to Regime Collapse
Analyst’s Note: The instability cycle was triggered by anti-reservation (quota) protests during former Primer Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government. Protests were led in large part by students opposing perceived inequities in public sector recruitment for civil service jobs. In the phase (Feb-14 Aug 2024) leading up to Hasina’s regime collapse, 1,292 unrest events were recorded by Seerist. This accounted for 37.4% of total verified events logged for Bangladesh during this period. Initially policy-focused and campus-centered, demonstrations escalated rapidly following forceful security responses, which acted as the primary inflection point in unrest.
Verified Unrest and Crime Events between 1 February 2024 – 15 August 2025 in Bangladesh
Post-Hasina Unrest Trends: From Uprising to Chronic Instability
Pre-election 2026 Environment: Escalation of Unrest and Electoral Trajectory Present Converging Risk Vectors
Analyst’s Note: The protest cycle was re-energized in late 2025 to early 2026 by the assassination of Sharif Osman Hadi on 12 December. Hadi was a student leader and spokesperson for Inquilab Mancha, or “Platform for Revolution”. This killing acted as a catalytic trigger for large demonstrations, marches and road blockades, particularly concentrated in urban centers. This incident showcases the persistence of high-impact political violence and latent capacity for rapid mass mobilization. In parallel, election-linked mobilization has intensified, with 118 election-related unrest events recorded in total, including 58 in the post-transition period. These include protests, sit-ins, blockades and violent incidents involving candidates, party activists and public institutions, reflecting a growing tendency to contest political outcomes through street pressure and coercive signaling rather than institutional channels. Protest tactics have hardened across the board. Arson remains elevated, assaults and targeted attacks are increasingly present, and improved explosive device (IED) usage has surfaced in the post-Hasina period, collectively signaling erosion of protest discipline and reduced predictability. As the 12 February 2026 elections approach, political polarization, communal tension, labor pressure, militant drift and the exclusion effects of the Awami League ban are converging, not offsetting each other.
Verified Unrest and Crime Events between 12 December 2025 – 11 January 2026 in Bangladesh
Coporate & Travel Risks Implications Violent unrest leading to elections and instances of targeted political violence Disruption to campaigning, rallies and polling logistics Transport disruption due to blockades and strikes (i.e., convergence of the labor and political spheres) Operational disruption to businesses and supply chains, especially in industrial corridors where 74% of labor unrest is concentrated post-transition Heightened travel risk for personnel, including exposure to flash protests, communal incidents and collateral damage due to explosive threats
Monitor election related unrest in Bangladesh using EventsAI
A built-in Boolean keyword search for capturing political unrest incidents leading up to the election
Bangladesh’s HIGH political and policy environments are persistently challenging for business, while a MEDIUM Political Risk Rating indicates that the political and policy environments are periodically challenging for business.
Unrest intensified sharply from May 2024 onwards and reached its absolute peak in August 2024 with 388 incidents. During the pre-collapse period, 211 arson and fire-related incidents were recorded, indicating a deterioration of protest discipline and a shift towards vandalism and targeting of state and ruling party-linked assets. This phase marked the metamorphosis from grievance-centric protest to violent anti-regime uprising that directly preceded the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s authority.
Verified Unrest and Crime Events by ‘Attack Type’
Verified Unrest and Crime Events by ‘Sector’
Analyst’s Note: The post-transition phase did not produce stabilization. 2,163 unrest events were recorded after 15 August 2024. This represents a 67.4% increase in unrest incidents when compared to unrest levels in the lead up to former PM Hasina’s removal – highlighting the structural persistence of instability. Unrest reconfigured into fragmented political, communal and factional violence.
Verified Unrest and Crime Events between 15 August 2024 – 12 December 2025 in Bangladesh
Communal violence intensified. The verified events dataset records 62 minority-targeting incidents in total, of which 39 (63%) occurred post-transition, reflecting an escalation in identity-linked violence. These include attacks on homes, temples and individuals, with lynching and burning incidents indicating extreme brutality. Labor unrest is structurally embedded. 446 labour-related unrests were recorded overall, with 114 pre-collapse and 332 post-collapse, meaning 74.4% of all labour unrest occurred after Hasina’s exit. These include repeated garment worker protests, factory shutdowns, wage disputes, road blockades and clashes with security forces, concentrated in industrial belts. Arson remains elevated. 212 arson/fire-related incidents were recorded post-transition, compared to 211 pre-collapse, indicating no reduction in destructive protest capability. Political exclusion dynamics deepened: the ban on the Awami League has not demobilized its support base but coincides with recurrent targeting of party offices, activists and politically-affiliated properties, reinforcing suppression-retaliation cycles. Militant drift is visible in operations. IED and homemade explosive device incidents emerge primarily in the post-Hasina period, indicating a qualitative hardening of tactics and increased asymmetry in the threat environment.
Verified Unrest and Crime Events by 'Attack Type'
Seerist’s EventsAI Emotions Analysis (25 Sept – 25 Nov 2025) Click green buttons above to view the Verified Event.
Security and Political Outlook in Bangladesh
Announcement of February election date to ease uncertainty; disruption likely in run-up to polls Although political campaigning is meant to begin in late January 2026, the announcement of the election schedule will drive a gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of political rallies and demonstrations across the country. Such events tend to cause traffic congestion and restrict mobility, fueling some operational disruption for businesses. Pre-election violence is also likely. There have already been reports of clashes between political parties and among factions in the BNP seeking to assert their influence. The Awami League will also seek to sabotage the polls, though its capacity to cause large-scale disruption is limited. However, although security risks will remain elevated in the run-up to the elections, the desire of all contesting political parties to ensure that elections proceed smoothly, and the presence of the military to maintain law and order, mean that any violence is likely to be localized and short-lived. Controls Risks’ Analysis
Analyzing Nepal’s Risk Landscape & Volatility
Analyst’s Note: Nepal’s range of PulseAI scores between 21 September 2025 to 21 November 2025 were from 45.6-58.9. Drops in Nepal’s PulseAI score were largely driven by the immediate consequence of 8-9 September Gen-Z protests, and similar protests in the past week. The persistently low PulseAI scores underscore the heightened political instability and civil unrest risks due to the waning legitimacy of the traditional political parties and growing disapproval of the interim government in the country. Leading into the March 2026 elections, Nepal faces a persistent outlook of political instability and heightened civil unrest risks. The scheduled elections are intended to legitimize the interim government, but underlying public discontent over corruption and economic mismanagement, particularly among youth, continues to fuel potential protests. The political landscape is further complicated by the emergence of new political forces challenging established parties and by significant internal divisions within major parties like the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML. Pro-monarchy sentiment, while unlikely to result in the restoration of the monarchy, contributes to the volatile environment. The youth movement remains a key factor, scrutinizing the government's actions and demanding accountability. These factors contribute to the potential for further clashes between protesters and security forces moving forward.
Heatmap of Verified Unrest and Crime Events across Nepal (1 Jan 2025 – 11 Jan 2026)
Nepal’s Political, Operational, and Security Risk Ratings
Timeline of Political and Social Unrest in Nepal over 12 months
Verified Unrest and Crime Events between 1 Jan 2025 – 11 Jan 2026 in Nepal
Analyzing Verified Events Trends in Nepal over 12 months
Monitor Political Unrest across Nepal using EventsAI
Analyst’s Note: Seerist has predominantly recorded the emotion of ‘Anger’ across 147 reports using only high and medium reliability-tagged sources between 24 Sept and 20 Nov 2025. This likely reflects the ongoing impact of 8-9 September Gen-Z protests as the country prepares for the March 2026 election. The highest levels of ‘Anger’ were registered on 20 November due to clashes in Simara between Gen-Z protesters and security forces that resulted in multiple injuries. The spike in unrest was attributed to tensions around the 19 November confrontation between Gen-Z protesters and members of the Communist Party of Nepal-UML.
Security and Political Outlook in Nepal
Nepal’s MEDIUM Political Risk rating indicates that the political and policy environments are periodically challenging for business. While a HIGH Security Risk Rating presents persistent and serious challenges for business.
Analyst’s Note: The 8-9 September 2025 youth-led protests coincided with the 28 March 2025 pro-monarchy protests in terms of being anti-government in nature. However, the concerns, and the actors involved were different, and the casualties and severity of the damage were manifold. This is particularly underscored from the attack type. Of the 280 protest(demonstration) recorded from 1 January 2025 to 11 January 2026, 76 were arson/firebomb, and 34 were categorized as vandalism. Between 8 and 9 September 2025, there were 94 protests(demonstration) (33.5%), 66 arson/firebombs (86.8%), and 22 vandalism (64.7%) events which is exponentially higher frequency of recorded events in a hyper condensed period. Similar trends were prevalent in major cities, including Kathmandu and Pokhara.
The top three sectors targeted in 2025 included government (54.35 %), law enforcement / legal (15.86%), and private property (7.16%). Local community groups (81.18%) were the most active ‘perpetrators’ associated, likely skewed due to the two-day Gen-Z protests.
Karki’s ability to facilitate prompt consensus for the elections and engaging stakeholders across the political spectrum, judiciary, security forces and the Election Commission, is commendable. But her limited mandate means that substantial institutional or structural reforms are unlikely. Moreover, key political groups, including the CPN-UML, have opposed Karki’s appointment as interim prime minister, citing a violation of constitutional rules. A Supreme Court verdict on the matter is pending, but it will shape Nepal’s political climate when it arrives. Upholding Karki’s position could validate elections but potentially risk election boycotts and protests by political parties, while her removal or a reversal of parliament's dissolution may increase uncertainty and unrest, especially among the youth, who largely endorse her appointment. While their objections may serve strategic purposes, it is unlikely that they will entirely boycott the elections, as this will jeopardize their political survival. At the same time, any sign of backsliding, a delay to the elections or actions perceived as superficial or ineffective could further destabilize the political environment, as youth groups will likely perceive such outcomes as a rejection of their cause and stage fresh protests. Continued engagement and support from all stakeholders is critical for Karki to deliver fair and timely elections.
Forecasting Outlook for Nepal’s 2026 Election Cycle
Previous political movements in Nepal, including those that ended the monarchy (2006) and enabled Nepal to become a republic (2008), were successful in facilitating major shifts in the political dynamic, but in 2025, issues around governance and institutional reform remain unaddressed. Also, whereas earlier movements in the country sought to establish democratic apparatuses, this one called for an overhaul of the system. For Karki and Nepal’s next elected government, restoring credibility to institutions like the police, the judiciary and the executive will have profound, long-term implications for the country’s operating environment. Control Risks’ Analysis
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Government: 281 (54.35%)
Law enforcement/Legal: 82 (15.86%)
Private Property: 37 (7.16%)
Education: 28 (5.42%)
Construction: 21 (4.06%)
Religious: 20 (3.87%)
Retail: 15 (2.90%)
Road: 13 (2.51%)
Healthcare: 12 (2.32%)
Financial: 8 (1.55%)
Protest (demonstration): 280 (53.74%)
Arson / Firebomb: 76 (14.59%)
Vandalism: 34 (6.53%)
Sit-in: 30 (5.76%)
Strike: 29 (5.57%)
Sticks / beating: 26 (4.99%)
Blockades: 16 (3.07%)
Gun (firearm): 14 (2.69%)
Robbery: 10 (1.92%)
Knife / bladed weapon: 6 (1.15%)
Seerist’s EventsAI Emotions Analysis (24 Sept – 20 Nov 2025) EventsAI Emotions identify and categorize emotions expressed in textual data. Click the green buttons above to view the EventsAI.
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