Syria
Risk Landscape and Business Opportunities Outlook
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Overview
Risk Landscape
Terrorism
Regional Map
Unrest + Crime
Political
Business Outlook
Sanctions
Investments
Ports + Airports
Control Risks' Analysis
Syria Security Risk Overview
After 13 years of civil war, former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) members now dominate the country’s political and security apparatus despite the group’s formal dissolution. Former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) on 29 January 2025 was named interim president and the 2012 constitution was suspended.
Security Risk Ratings map overlay by governorate and Syria’s corresponding Pulse Score
Armed opposition and communal integration Other armed groups control diverse parts of the country including eastern Syria, which is controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF). Despite a 10 March agreement between the SDF and the caretaker government intended to integrate the SDF into Syrian state structures, implementation has stalled amid deep mistrust. High communal tensions resulting in sectarian clashes continue to occur, with Druze communities in Al-Suwayda and Alawite communities in Latakia being particularly affected. Syria's transition Syria’s transition reflects both institutional consolidation and continued fragmentation. Core institutions have been preserved in Damascus yet contested legitimacy and local power centers continue to limit centralization. While the political transition process is in the early stages and remains uncertain, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa have indicated their intention to seek international recognition and support. Any investments will be comparatively more viable in areas where state authority is strongest; in parallel, minority-dominated and border regions will remain marked by instability, legitimacy challenges and elevated security risks.
Timeline of Verified Events in Syria since January 1, 2025
Analyst’s Note: Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has continued to see consistently high levels of Verified Events due to ongoing clashes with minority forces in Aleppo and Al-Suwayda governorates, enduring terrorism activity, and persistent unrest.
RISK LANDSCAPE: TERRORISM
War
Terrorism in Syria
Terrorism in Syria is largely limited to small-scale attacks conducted by Islamic State (IS) militants targeting residents and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the Euphrates River in Deir Ezzour governorate. However, attacks have been recorded nationwide, including infrequent attacks in Damascus.
Heatmap of Verified Terrorism Events in Syria over the last six months
RISK LANDSCAPE: UNREST + CRIME
Syria Terrorism Risk Rating: HIGH Deir Ezzour Terrorism Risk Rating: EXTREME
Analyst’s Note: Verified Terrorism Events in Deir Ezzour governorate, perpetrated by the Islamic State (IS) have decreased by 29.3 percent in the last year.
Analyst’s Note: Approximately 85% of verified terrorism events in Syria were in Deir Ezzour governorate: over 77% of those were limited to small-arms attacks and over 95% resulted in fewer than five casualties.
No Casualties: 48%
One Casualty: 24%
Two Casualties: 10%
Three Casualties: 10%
Four Casualties: 4%
Five Casualties: 2%
Greater than Five Casualties: 2%
Gun (firearm): 77
RPG: 10
Roadside bomb: 6
Grenade: 3
Landmine: 1
Mortar: 1
Suicide bomber: 1
Terrorism in Damascus
The risk of terrorism in Damascus is very high. Terrorist groups, including IS, remain active in the Badiya region (the central desert), posing a significant threat to both locals and visitors.
Damascus Terrorism Risk Rating: HIGH
Heatmap of Verified Terrorism Events in Syria over the last six months Click the green circles to view the Verified Event.
Brief Analysis: A suicide bombing on June 22, 2025, at the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Damascus, claimed by the Sunni militant group Saraya Ansar al-Sunna (SAS), underscores the ongoing terrorism risk. SAS framed the bombing as retaliation for the government’s ban on unlicensed proselytization, imposed after Salafists sought to convert Christians outside the Mar Elias Church in March. Sunni militant groups maintain the intent to launch high-impact attacks targeting minorities, former regime affiliates, and state security personnel. Attacks in the capital remain infrequent but the risk to public spaces and religious sites in the area remains. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
RISK LANDSCAPE
Unrest in Syria
As the new transitional government seeks domestic and international legitimacy and stability, high levels of unrest will continue, especially in Southern Syria, where the inciting protests in 2011 also originated.
Heatmap of Verified Unrest Events in Syria since January 1, 2025
RISK LANDSCAPE: WAR
Syria Unrest Risk Rating: HIGH
Analyst’s Note: Over 21 percent of unrest events in Syria were related to Israeli airstrikes, Israeli military action in the Palestinian Territories, or Israeli negotiations with the transitional government. Unrest is likely to spike in response to the news cycle; however, the majority of all unrest remains peaceful.
Kidnapping and Executive Safety
Security Risk Rating: EXTREME Kidnap Risk Rating: EXTREME
Brief Analysis: Kidnap-for-ransom remains a significant security concern, with foreign nationals representing highly attractive targets. The kidnap risk rating will remain HIGH for commercial personnel in Damascus across all business sectors and despite heightened security, with small business owners facing an elevated risk. The kidnap risk stems from both financially and ideologically motivated criminals, targeting victims based on perceived wealth or affiliation with the former regime. The incidents highlight the state’s persistent struggle to restrain rogue or ideologically driven elements within its security forces. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Click green circle to view Verified Event.
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Tracking Captagon Smuggling with EventsAI
The transitional government will continue to prioritize dismantling the Captagon trade, as future diplomatic and economic negotiations with Arab neighbors will hinge on its success.
Brief Analysis: Syria remains a high-risk environment for both petty crime and organized transnational activity, despite a degree of stabilization since the peak of lawlessness that followed the former regime’s December 2024 ousting. Criminal dynamics – particularly in border regions – are still shaped by the legacies of civil war. Before its fall, the Assad regime oversaw an industrial-scale Captagon trade worth up to USD $10bn annually. While that system collapsed with the regime, its infrastructure and networks were never fully dismantled. Elements of those operations remain active, sustaining both local criminal economies and cross-border trafficking. This persistence has significant regional implications: neighboring states, particularly Jordan, continue to face security threats from cross-border flows and have resorted to military action against traffickers. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Timeline of Verified Crime Events perpetrated by drug smugglers along the Jordanian border since August 2024
Israeli Airstrikes on Key Infrastructure
Brief Analysis: The departure of Iran-backed paramilitary groups (IBPGs) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from Syria, both of which were regularly targeted by Israel, has decreased the potential threat of further airstrikes in Syria. Still, Israel could have intent to target military installations that it might perceive to pose a threat to its national security in the future. After the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli security forces targeted hundreds of military sites housing weapons and military equipment, as well as chemical weapons depots, used by the former Assad regime, including airports, airbases, Minet Al-Bayda port and the Port of Latakia. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
RISK LANDSCAPE: POLITICAL
Heatmap and Timeline of Israeli airstrikes in Syria since December 1, 2024 Click green buttons for a deeper dive into ports and airport disruption.
Monitoring the Parliamentary Elections
Brief Analysis: The election of the parliament represents a positive development, enabling limited political pluralism and debate. Significant power will likely rest with Sharaa and the executive branch, and the make-up of the parliament (which is liable to change with Sharaa’s nominations) is unlikely to significantly impact policymaking over the coming months. Elections in Kurdish and Druze areas will likely remain indefinitely postponed, leaving seats vacant in the parliament and further entrenching a degree of autonomy in those areas of the country. The presence of elected members of parliament (albeit indirectly) for government-held areas but not the rest of the country will likely bolster the effective autonomy of the Kurdish and Druze areas. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
BUSINESS OUTLOOK: SANCTIONS
Analyst’s Note: Seerist’s EventsAI Emotions recorded elevated levels of Fear the day after the parliamentary elections. There were also moderate spikes in Anger and Sadness.
Local criticisms include: Lack of transparency regarding candidate eligibility, including political violence against candidates or allegedly arbitrary dismissals Exclusion of Kurdish-controlled areas in the Northeast (Raqqa and Hasakah) and Druze-controlled areas in Al-Suwayda governorate. The elections disproportionately represented the Sunni population in geographic areas already loyal to and supportive of the government. Authority will continue to be centralized in the executive and parliament’s role will be limited and largely performative for international legitimacy
Monitoring Sanctions and Normalization
The easing of Western sanctions provides near-term opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction, but investment remains vulnerable to “snapback” sanctions and political conditionality.
BUSINESS OUTLOOK: INVESTMENTS
Brief Analysis: Robust compliance systems and flexible risk management will be critical as Syria’s reintegration remains partial, provisional, and conditional on inclusive governance and counter-terrorism commitments. Western governments will continue targeted sanctions on individuals and groups accused of human rights abuses while expanding exemptions for humanitarian and economic aid. Sectoral exemptions may emerge in the coming months, but broad sanctions relief remains uncertain. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
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BUSINESS OUTLOOK
24 February The EU suspended select restrictive measures to facilitate activity in humanitarian relief, energy, construction, and transport, including the delisting of five entities
30 June US President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) dismantling much of the Syria-specific sanctions framework, revoking five earlier EOs and ordering reviews of measures under the Caesar Act.
10 November Syrian President Al-Sharaa visits the White House and meets with US President Trump
24 April The UK lifted sanctions on Syria’s new Ministry of Defense.
7 July The US revoked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS)’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation.
Countries are also slowly reopening embassies. Twelve countries have reopened embassies in Damascus since December 2024. Others, like Canada, will appoint non-resident ambassadors until necessary progress is made.
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Monitoring Diplomacy and Foreign Investment
Brief Analysis: Syria remains one of the most difficult environments in the Middle East in which to do business. Regulatory and licensing processes will remain opaque, with personal connections continuing to play a key role in securing approvals. The country is in a state of economic collapse and institutional revamp. Nevertheless, the caretaker government remains open to foreign investment. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
BUSINESS OUTLOOK: PORTS + AIRPORTS
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Ports and Airport Disruption
Israeli airstrikes, following the fall of the Assad regime, led to major damage to airport runways, hangars, and aircraft, as well as terminal buildings and port infrastructure. Analyst Note: Since 1 December 2024, there have been 5 Verified Events of Israeli strikes against ports, and 25 Verified Events logged against airports and air bases.
REGIONAL MAP
Tartous Port, Latakia Port, and Minet Al-Bayda Port are all key access points to the Mediterranean Sea. The interim Syrian authorities in January 2025 revoked a 49-year port management contract and lease granted to a Russian engineering company in 2019 but remain in negotiations with the Kremlin regarding the future of Russia’s military footprint in Syria. The naval base at Tartous is Russia’s last military position on the Mediterranean. UAE-based AD Ports signed a deal to buy a minority stake in a terminal at Latakia Port for $22 million. UAE-based DP World signed an $800 million investment deal to modernize Tartous Port over the next 30 years.
Heatmap of Israeli airstrikes in Syria since December 1, 2024
Syrian airspace fully reopened in June 2025 Damascus International Airport resumed operations 10 days after the fall of the Assad regime. The airport closed briefly in response to security issues, such as Israeli airstrikes. As of November 2025, the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority reports 15 airlines have resumed flights to Damascus. The development deal for repairing and developing Damascus International Airport, signed by Syria’s General Authority of Civil Aviation, aims to hit a capacity of 6 million passengers by the end of 2026. Aleppo International Airport resumed limited operations in March 2025. Qamishli Airport and Latakia Airport both remain closed. Negotiations with SDF forces about reopening Qamishli Airport are ongoing.
BACK TO RISK LANDSCAPE: WAR
In Focus: Sectarian Violence in Latakia and Tartous Governorates
In Focus: Kurdish Forces in Aleppo and Raqqa Governorates
Terrorism in Syria: Al-Hol Camp
Terrorism in Syria: Deir Ezzour Governorate
Zooming In: Monitor Damascus
In Focus: Druze Clashes in Al-Suwayda Governorate
In Focus: Israeli Incursions in Quneitra Governorate
Click green buttons to take a deeper dive into regions.
CONTROL RISKS' ANALYSIS
Sectarian Violence in Latakia and Tartous Governorate
Brief Analysis: The Alawite majority provinces of Tartous and Latakia remain subject to sporadic flare-ups in tensions due to anti-government sentiment and sectarian grievances. The pace of civil unrest is likely to progressively increase over the coming months as the public assesses the effectiveness of the new authorities’ governance in increasingly critical ways. However, the propensity of such demonstrations to escalate into open confrontation is likely to decrease as the authorities prove their competency in managing and mitigating the risk of escalation. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
BACK TO REGIONAL MAP
Heatmap of Verified Events in Latakia and Tartous governorates flagged as sectarian since January 1, 2025
Analyst's Note: On March 6, 2025, attackers, described as former regime forces, targeted military checkpoints controlled by the interim government in several locations in Latakia and Tartous. At least 71 people were killed in the attacks. In response, the security and terrorism risk ratings in the area were raised from HIGH to EXTREME. In the months following, reports of harassment and revenge-driven attacks against Alawites have amplified fears of systemic community-level retribution by the new government.
Analyst's Note: On November 22, 2025, a Bedouin couple was murdered and residents quickly pointed fingers at the Alawite community, leading to vandalism and threat. On November 24, residents protested throughout Latakia and Tartous governorate, denouncing the ongoing targeting of Alawite citizens. Seerist verified over 19 related events, including protests, clashes with security forces, and attacks on the Alawite community. The interim government quickly denied that the crime in Homs was sectarian-related.
Analyst's Note: On November 27-30, leading up to the anniversary of Operation Deterrence of Aggression and the fall of the Assad regime, Seerist recorded pro-government unrest events taking place within the Latakia, Tartous, Hama, and Homs governorates. Government forces also held military parades, reportedly in predominantly Alawite neighborhoods, to celebrate the transitional government.
Kurdish Forces in Aleppo and Raqqa Governorates
Brief Analysis: Despite the March 2025 ceasefire agreement that outlined the eventual integration of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syria’s military, clashes with government-affiliated forces continue intermittently.
Heatmap of Verified War Events between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces in Syria since January 1, 2025
Turkish-backed forces and their loyal factions continue to exchange fire with Kurdish forces despite ceasefire.
A key driver is the presence of former Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters, who have since been absorbed into Syrian army divisions stationed near SDF-controlled areas in Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, parts of Deir Ezzour, and sections of Aleppo’s countryside. These elements frequently seek confrontation with the SDF, resulting in limited but recurring skirmishes with Kurdish forces. While such hostilities have so far remained contained since the ceasefire, the risk of escalation remains significant: the collapse of the ceasefire would very likely prompt Türkiye to intensify military operations against Kurdish positions in northern Syria. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Analyst’s Note: Over 20.6 percent of related Verified War Events since January 1, 2025, occurred within a 5mi radius of Qarqozak Bridge and over 22.3 percent occurred within a 5 mi radius of Tishrin Dam. Both assets are chokepoints, separating Turkish-backed forces and Syrian Ministry of Defense forces west of the Euphrates from the Kurdish forces located on the East
Qarqozak Bridge serves as a critical chokepoint and potential logistical supply route. Turkish-backed forces target the area during offensives and have attempted several incursions with aerial support, because securing the bridge would mean gaining a staging point to push into SDF-held areas east of the Euphrates and take territory previously inaccessible to them.
Tishrin Dam, a hydropower plant that generates a significant amount of electricity, has been out of service since December 2024, due to damage sustained in clashes between Kurdish forces and Turkish-backed forces in the area. Beyond power, the dam also regulates the flow of the Euphrates River, critical for irrigation, agriculture, and water supply. Repairs hinge on the successful implementation of the April agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, which would allow government repair crews to access the dam.
Al-Hol Camp
The Al-Hol camp is the most well-known of the two camps in Northeastern Syria that house Islamic State (IS) members and their families.
Key Analysis Points: Al-Hol camp is estimated to hold at least 10,000 Islamic State (IS) fighters, presenting a persistent risk of radicalization or, in an unlikely but worst-case scenario, a mass-breakout, both of which could cause an increase in IS activity in Northeastern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently maintain control over the camp, however, they have been gradually transferring administrative responsibilities to the interim government. The international community has been using the continued existence of the camps to exert pressure on the interim government, demanding the closure of the camps and repatriation of foreign nationals as a condition for receiving foreign assistance and funding. The interim government currently only has the capacity and finances to repatriate foreign nationals to countries that want them, like Iraq. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Monitor Damascus using Verified Events
Brief Analysis: The city’s central areas were largely spared the immediate consequences of the civil conflict. Key areas include locations along Mezzeh Street (where multilateral organizations have their offices), and the Malki and Al-Roudah areas. Damascus is experiencing high crime rates amid socioeconomic hardship linked to the civil war and international isolation. Levels of violent crime have risen, including armed robberies and residential burglaries.
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Verified Events:
Unrest is common in several squares: Marjeh Square Hijaz Square Umayyad Square The majority of protests are peaceful and in response to new changes implemented by the government or foreign issues
The HTS-led government is struggling to rebuild security forces, with police stations severely understaffed. This has led to a surge in crimes including theft, looting and violent incidents. High-risk areas include Yarmouk Camp, Dummar District and Barzeh. Anecdotal reports suggest that the crime rate in Damascus has remained high since the end of the Assad regime in early December. The crime rate was severe under the Assad regime because of the symbiotic relationship between regime figures, the security forces, and organized crime that had intensified during the civil war. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Timeline of Verified Events by category
Heatmap of Seerist's Verified Events (VEs) within a 6.2 mile radius of Damascus since January 1, 2025
Following clashes with Druze groups in Al-Suwayda, Israel struck several sites in Damascus and southern Syria. Similar strikes are possible, should clashes escalate in the future.
Crime risks include kidnappings, anti-Alawite crime and harassment, as well as unknown groups launching rockets or detonating car bombs, targeting forces from the current or former regime.
Monitor Damascus using Events AI
Seerist’s EventsAI by category, EmotionsAI, and Sentiment Analysis for all EventsAI results within a 6.2-mile radius of Damascus in the last 60 days
Israeli Incursions in Quneitra Governorate
Israel will likely maintain operations in Syria over the coming months as it seeks a demilitarized zone to create a buffer with the new authorities. Brief Analysis: Damascus on 25 August reported that Israel had seized Syrian territory around Mount Hermon, near a hilltop position that overlooks the locality of Beit Jinn. Katz had affirmed in March that Israel would hold swathes of Syrian territory for an “unlimited amount of time”, though an eventual withdrawal remains possible. Israel is likely to reinforce and expand its de facto buffer zone in southern Syria to prevent hostile forces from operating near its borders. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Heatmap of Verified artillery shelling and gunfire by Israeli security forces in Quneitra governorate in 2025
Israeli security forces infrequently encounter unrest and violent attacks, due to local discontent with any Israeli presence in the area.
One objective in Israel’s presence in Quneitra is to remove any Iran-backed paramilitary groups from the country and destroy all associated infrastructure.
Another objective in Israel’s involvement in Syria broadly is to support the Druze in Al-Suwayda governorate, who they have backed with aerial operations during previous escalations.
Damascus and Tel Aviv continue to negotiate about a potential buffer-zone; however, talks stalled in September due to disagreements about implementing a “humanitarian corridor”.
Druze Clashes in Al-Suwayda governorate
Brief Analysis: In Al-Suwayda governorate, Druze militias remain dominant and openly resist Damascus. The transitional government, the US, and Jordan in July announced a tripartite “roadmap” for Al-Suwayda to restore stability. However, the plan excluded the main anti-government Druze faction that currently controls the governorate. The group has demanded the creation of a separate Druze entity following sectarian violence in mid-July between Druze militias, government forces and Bedouin tribes. Militarily supported by Israel, these anti-government Druze groups have consolidated control and established a de-facto autonomy that Damascus will find difficult to reverse or reclaim. Source: Syria Country Report - Seerist
Heatmap of related Verified War Events in Al-Suwayda since April 1, 2025
Denotes Israeli Security Force activities
Heatmap of Israeli airstrikes in southern Syria, July 15-31, 2025
Control Risks’ Analysis
Compliance risks to persist in Syria despite expected further lifting of sanctions Overview Syria’s Economy Minister Mohammed Nidal al-Shaar on 21 October said he hoped US sanctions would be lifted in the coming months. Most of the nationwide sanctions regimes targeting Syria have been lifted in recent months, and the US is likely to permanently repeal its legislation mandating secondary sanctions. In the meantime, the US will renew waivers to allow US and third-country companies to engage with the Syrian market. Despite progress on lifting sanctions in recent months, Syria will remain a market presenting extensive compliance risks, including due to continuing targeted sanctions. Financial crime, including concerns around money laundering and financing of terrorism, will also constitute a key obstacle for investors looking to enter the Syrian market in the coming months. Syrian demands Shaar optimistically said that, once the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (widely known as the “Caesar Act”) is lifted, Syria would be “sanctions-free”. The Caesar Act is the US’s last significant remaining piece of legislation that specifically targets Syria. It was enacted in 2019 and mandates secondary sanctions against foreign individuals and entities that conduct transactions with Syria’s government or military. The law was extended for five years until 2029 in December 2024, but the US State Department on 23 May waived it for 180 days until 19 November. The US has been dismantling its Syria-specific sanctions regime over recent months. On 30 June, the US administration issued Executive Order 14312, lifting most sanctions against Syria. On 28 August, the US Commerce Department relaxed export controls for many civilian goods, including aircraft parts and communications devices.
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Congressional approval Congress is likely to repeal the Caesar Act by the end of the year. Repeal legislation introduced in June in both houses of Congress has bipartisan support, and the US Senate (upper house) on 9 October included repeal of the Caesar Act in its version of annual defense policy legislation, known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). (However, it added a non-binding caveat that sanctions should be reimposed if the Syrian government does not meet certain security, governance and human rights conditions.) Although a similar provision was not included in the US House of Representatives (lower house) version of the NDAA adopted in September, lifting sanctions on Syria is a priority of the US administration, and repeal of the Caesar Act is likely to be included in the final version of the NDAA negotiated over the coming months. The continuing US government shutdown and escalating partisan hostility make it unclear when a final vote on the NDAA will occur, though it is almost certain before a 31 December deadline. That said, adoption before November’s Congressional recess is very unlikely, so the existing Caesar Act sanctions waiver will almost certainly be renewed for a further 180 days until at least May 2026. Ongoing barriers Despite major improvements to Syria’s overall sanctions environment (thanks to the US’s lifting of sanctions as well as similar moves by the EU and other sanctioning countries), significant compliance risks will endure over the coming years. EO 14312 reaffirmed or introduced sanctions on 139 individuals and entities primarily associated with the former regime of Bashar al-Assad (2000-24); meanwhile, continuing Export Administration Regulations restrictions – particularly regarding dual-use goods – will warrant care on the part of exporters. Further, sanctions targeting terrorist organisations as well as Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to affect Syria. In addition, concerns over financial crime, including money laundering and the financing of terrorism, will continue to warrant extensive due diligence by foreign companies considering entering the Syrian market. Moreover, even in the absence of sanctions, such compliance risks will hamper Syria’s reintegration into the international economy by limiting the uptake of correspondent banking relationships between globally integrated banks and actors in the domestic market. Source: Control Risks, published 23 October
The US has been dismantling its Syria-specific sanctions regime over recent months.
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