SEERIST BIG PICTURE SERIES
Israel-Iran Tensions
On the Verge of Emerging from the Shadows
Not a gamble
Israel’s presumed airstrike on the Iranian consulate – Israel does not affirm or deny airstrikes in the region outside Lebanon – constitutes a significant escalation in the shadow conflict between the two. Israel’s targeting of an Iranian diplomatic asset in an airstrike is a first, while the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi constitutes the most high-profile casualty in years of regular targeting by Israel of IRGC assets in the region. Zahedi was responsible for the IRGC’s operation in Syria and Lebanon, including cooperation with Lebanese Shia movement Hizbullah. His death, along with that of his deputy, is likely to impair coordination between Iran and Hizbullah, at least temporarily.
Whether or not Zahedi was targeted specifically, the strike against the consulate is indicative of Israel’s growing intent to reshape the regional security order. In recent months, Israel has increased the scope and pace of its targeting of Hizbullah – even as the movement’s cross-border attacks against Israel have remained within established rules of engagement (they have largely focused on Israeli military targets close to the de facto border). With the 1 April strike, Israel has bolstered its deterrence posture and signalled that it will act forcefully against Iran, including in response to actions carried out by Iran-backed groups. In the coming months, Israel will continue to target Iranian and Iran-linked assets in the region. Israel will focus on assets in Syria and those associated with Hizbullah, but may expand targeting to Iraq over the coming months.
Israel’s targeting will be characterised by significant risk appetite and show relatively limited concern for the potential for a miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Israel assesses that Iran does not want open conflict with the US and that a direct and forceful retaliation by Iran would likely prompt Washington to step up its involvement. Accordingly, Israel likely considers that Iran’s response will remain muted. Significantly, Israel likely assesses that it would also achieve a strategic win if Iran were to respond forcefully and draw the US into a regional escalation. Such a course of action would give Israel the protection of the US’s military might and dial up pressure on Iranian regional influence and military capabilities.
Iran’s likely response
Iran needs to retaliate, and its response will shape the evolution of the Israel-Iran stand-off. In our most likely scenario, we anticipate that because Tehran does not want an open conflict with the US, it will carefully calibrate its response. In the first instance, Iran is likely to leverage its network of regional proxies to target Israel in cross-border missile and drone attacks, particularly from Syria and Iraq.
Over the coming weeks, the IRGC could also seek to carry out a direct operation against Israeli interests outside Israel. For instance, in recent years Iran has targeted alleged Israeli assets in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Retaliation against an Israeli diplomatic asset in the region is also possible, though Iran would likely prioritise an in-country low-intensity operation over a cross-border attack. Strikes against US forces and facilities are possible, but less likely given that Iran wants to preserve the effective truce between its proxies and the US in place since February.
Even if Iran carefully calibrates its response, tensions are likely to increase over the coming months. Tit-for-tat attacks will continue, with occasional casualties among IRGC ranks and Iran-backed groups stepping up targeting of Israel. However, absent a direct strike on Israel by Iran or an attack causing a large number of Israeli civilian casualties, this would not trigger US involvement and an open conflict. Instead, Washington is likely to seek to contain Israel’s escalatory steps to avoid being drawn into a regional escalation.
Meanwhile, diplomatic engagement by Gulf Arab countries with Tehran is likely to continue to mitigate the threat of a broader regional escalation in the coming months. Significantly, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have all condemned the 1 April attack.
Spiral
A significant regional escalation has become more likely following the 1 April airstrike, but remains a credible alternative scenario. Iran is intent on avoiding a full-blown conflict, but the balance it has to strike is a delicate one. From Tehran’s standpoint, too strong a response – for instance, directly targeting Israeli soil – would risk dragging the US into a conflict and posing severe threats to regime survival.
However, Iran also needs to re-establish deterrence and maintain legitimacy as the leader of the “axis of resistance”. Too weak a response would expose Iran to further high-impact Israeli attacks over the coming months and diminish hardliner support for the regime, as well as its influence over regional proxy groups. In such a scenario, Israel would escalate its targeting of Iranian targets in the region over the coming months, potentially targeting Iranian military and nuclear assets or IRGC leaders on Iran’s soil.
Calibrating its retaliation to deter further escalation by Israel while simultaneously avoiding dragging the US into an open confrontation will be difficult. Failure to do so would risk triggering an escalatory spiral that could begin immediately if the response is too strong, or within a few months if it is too weak and Israel crosses a new red line.
An open confrontation between Iran and the groups it backs in the region on the one hand, and Israel and the US on the other, would have significant consequences for businesses in the region and further afield. Should the Iranian leadership feel that its survival is threatened or see its regional influence severely rolled back, it would likely seek to exploit all strategic options at its disposal. It would start by encouraging further attacks by regional groups and, if necessary, could attempt to actively disrupt oil exports and international shipping, including in the Red Sea and the Gulf.
Sources:
“Israel operating 'all over Middle East' against foes, defence chief says”, Reuters
“Tehran vows response after strike blamed on Israel destroyed Iran’s Consulate in Syria and killed 12”, AP News
“Top Iranian general killed by Israeli airstrike”, Axios
Control Risks
Explore Seerist Today
See how Seerist can support your security operations and intelligence analysis efforts.
Request a demo
Israel’s presumed airstrike on Iran’s consulate in the Syrian capital Damascus on 1 April constitutes an unprecedented escalation in Israel’s shadow war with Iran. We consider potential pathways for the evolution of the stand-off between Israel and Iran over the next six months.
Israel will maintain a highly aggressive posture toward Iran over the coming months. In particular, it will continue to regularly target Iran-associated assets across the region.
However Iran responds, it will seek to mitigate the threat of an uncontrolled escalation over the coming months. Tehran does not assess that it stands to make significant geostrategic gains from a head-on confrontation with Israel and the US.
In our most likely scenario, Iran maintains a primarily conservative approach to retaliation. Meanwhile, the US seeks to temper Israel’s efforts to reduce Iran’s regional influence. Accordingly, a major regional flare-up is avoided.
In an alternative scenario, Iran either retaliates too forcefully or fails to re-establish deterrence. Israel escalates attacks against Iran and eventually conducts a kinetic attack against targets in Iran.
